| 1 | IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | | |
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| 2 | FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON | | |
| 3 | OREGON ADVOCACY CENTER,) | | |
| 4 | et al.,) Plaintiffs,) | Case No. 3:02-cv-00339-MO | |
| 5 | v. | Case No. 3:02-CV-00339-NO | |
| 6 | BOBBY MINK, et al., | | |
| 7 | Defendants. | | |
| 8 | JAROD BOWMAN, et al., | | |
| 9 | Plaintiffs, | Case No. 3:21-cv-01637-MO | |
| 10 | v.) | case No. 3.21 ev 01037 No | |
| 11 | DELORES MATTEUCCI, et al.,) | | |
| 12 | Defendants. | | |
| 13 | LEGACY HEALTH SYSTEM, et al.,) | | |
| 14 | Plaintiffs, | Case No. 6:22-cv-01460-MO | |
| 15 | v.) | | |
| 16 | PATRICK ALLEN,) | April 25, 2023 | |
| 17 | Defendant.) | Portland, Oregon | |
| 18 |) | | |
| 19 | | | |
| 20 | Oral Argument | | |
| 21 | TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS | | |
| 22 | BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL W. MOSMAN | | |
| 23 | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SENIOR JUDGE | | |
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(PROCEEDINGS)1 2 (April 25, 2023; 1:08 p.m.) * * * * * * * * 3 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: We are here today for oral 4 5 argument in Case No. 3:02-cv-339-MO, Oregon Advocacy Center, et 6 al. versus Mink, et al., Member Case Nos. 3:21-cv-1637-MO, and 7 6:22-cv-1460-MO. Counsel, please state your name for the record. 8 9 MR. STENSON: Your Honor, Tom Stenson, Disability 10 Rights Oregon. MR. MERRITHEW: Jesse Merrithew on behalf of 11 12 Metropolitan Public Defender. 13 MR. JOHNSON: Craiq Johnson with Department of 14 Justice for defendant. 15 MS. SCOTT: Carla Scott with the Department of 16 Justice for defendants. MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Alex Van Rysselberghe with 17 18 Stoel Rives for plaintiff health systems. 19 MR. NEIMAN: Eric Neiman for plaintiff health 20 systems, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. 22 Give me just a moment. Give me just a minute here. 23 To quote George Washington, it seems I've gone not only gray 24 but blind in the service of my country. So I need my reading 25 glasses.

(There is a pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: I thought it might be helpful to give you some tentative thoughts and then we can walk through your arguments about those after I'm done. And I'll break them out. I won't follow chronologically through the claims by number but in groups.

But first I want to discuss the motion to dismiss what I'll call health systems' claims on behalf of health systems. And the first major issue with regard to that motion has to do with standing. The parties agree on the general standard for standing. It's the fairly traceable prong that's the most important to me, and the argument is that it's not fairly traceable because the hospitals, the health systems have voluntarily entered into this arrangement. And, of course, it's almost always the case that if you voluntarily entered into an arrangement like this, that you can't -- you don't have a complaint for standing purposes. Numerous cases so hold.

So the real question is maybe a framing question to think about voluntariness here or is it voluntary. I don't know, for example -- I'm told without real debate that it's voluntary to enter into this arrangement, but I don't know if that's got what I'll call the Hotel California problem, where you can get in but you can't get out. If that's the case, then I would acknowledge that if you voluntarily entered into a business relationship that you are obligated to stay in for X

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years, and during those years things dramatically change so it wasn't the deal you got into in the first place, you might have standing in a case like that. But it looks like these are two-year arrangements, and the complaint is that this has been bad since 2017, so it looks like that's been reupped voluntarily during the pendency of the time in which the complaint says things are bad, and it looks like a standing problem because of voluntariness. So standing is one question.

If there is standing, then I'll look at the claims individually under 12(b)(6), and the first is the substantive That's claim 2. And there the standard is due process claim. whether the governmental action relates -- related to the use of the plaintiff's property lacks any substantial relation to the public health, safety, or general welfare.

And it appears to me that the governmental action is the use of health systems' hospital beds for long-term care for civilly committed patients. So it can't merely be that this governmental action has to be imperfect, it has to lack any substantial relation to public health. And I have trouble with that as a description of what's happening here. It appears to have some substantial relation to public health. But, again, tentative only are those thoughts.

There's also a procedural due process component to claim 2, but that has not been backed up by any argument, and so it appears to be waived.

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There's a Fifth Amendment takings claim. It looks a lot like the substantive due process claim in some ways. The argument is a physical taking, a physical taking of the beds, as I understand it, and so I don't know --I don't know what will happen with the voluntariness issue, but it comes up again in this setting.

So I suppose if there's no voluntariness for standing purposes, I might be persuaded that there's no voluntariness here, but it looks like you can't get the physical taking because of the voluntariness issue.

This case hasn't been pled or arqued as a regulatory taking, so I'm only treating it under the physical taking analysis. And the Oregon Constitution taking, the claim 4, will stand or fall pretty much on the federal analysis.

So those are health care systems' claims on behalf of health systems.

Now I want to look at the health systems' claims on behalf of patients. Here again, issue number one is standing, if health systems has to show injury in fact to health systems in order to bring a claim on behalf of a third party. we get past that, then I have to look at whether there's a close relationship to the third party, which is -- turns out to be, as it's litigated across cases, a sort of a correlation of interests as opposed to divergence of interests. And that's tough here because quite a few of the arguments made in other

settings by health systems are that these patients are a headache, that they cost them a lot of money, that they result in the attrition of staff, that they destroy property, and that they don't want to do this. And that starts not to sound like a correspondence of interests such that they could bring a claim on behalf of a third party.

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And then finally, when I look at the prong as to whether the third parties -- here the patients -- are hindered by their mental illness in advancing their claims on their own, well, that's again a mix. Obviously the answer is yes, yes for the reasons that maybe any indigent patient or other -- even any patient might be hindered in bringing a claim on its own because of illness. But almost by definition, some of these folks -- Well, let's put it this way. In a criminal case, they're disentitled, disenfranchised from making decisions on their own. So I don't know how they could bring a lawsuit. But I say a mix because, on the other hand, there's this lack of coalition of interests, and I have right in front of me an organization whose mission is dedicated to bringing claims on behalf of people like this. So why wouldn't I pick DRO rather than health systems to advance these claims? So that's the standing issue.

If I turn to 12(b)(6) and get past all that, then the substantive due process claim is again a question of adequate and effective treatment. And that, as a pleading matter, in my

view, may survive, given that that's what we're litigating generally.

There's again no argument on the procedural due process claim. The Oregon statutory claims 5 and 6, in particular, seem to me to devote the decision entirely to OHA, whose decision shall be final, which is read in many settings where that sort of language is used as nonreviewable. So that's a concern.

Claim 7 has a problem, in that it has to be -- is grounded in denying patients treatment or limiting them because of some disability, and that doesn't appear to be the foundation for the treatment decisions made here, since the entire set is identical in that way and a subset is being sent to health systems.

There is this motion for clarification on intervention, but let's start then, since it runs through all the claims, the claims themselves and both pieces of the motion to dismiss, let's start with standing, again with counsel for health systems.

Can I just put the first question to you, just -- MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Yes.

THE COURT: Why isn't this relationship voluntary?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: So the relationship, the voluntariness of the relationship, you can look at it in, I think, two ways. And Your Honor has brought up the way of

looking at it across a timeline. I think it is not voluntary if you look at it across even from '17, 2017 until now. There have been changes and just the worsening of Oregon's behavioral health crisis over that time. So it absolutely is one of those cases -- and I think we allege this in the complaint sufficiently -- that even the changes of -- in the Oregon State Hospital admissions and the decreasing resources outside the Oregon State Hospital for long-term treatment options has been changing over that period of time, such that the agreement that was made in '17 has to be reconsidered at this point, and that there's no voluntariness now there.

THE COURT: If you really reach the point where you really hated this arrangement -- which you're apparently close to doing -- could you leave the arrangement? Could you cease being designated as a facility that would receive these folks?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: So I think it's important to distinguish the kinds of treatment we're talking about here. There's the long-term treatment, which is what we cannot provide, and then there's the acute stabilizing treatment that we do and want to continue providing.

Now, I suppose that if signing up for the former kind of treatment, which is materially different, automatically signed us up to provide the latter, which we simply cannot provide, then in that case we could withdraw from the arrangement entirely. But that's to conflate these two kinds

of treatment that our allegations in the complaint distinguish.

THE COURT: Well, before I move further down that

path, I want to be clear then. You are in some sort of arrangement that initially, in your view, involved receiving from the State Hospital patients you did want to treat?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Correct.

THE COURT: And you did -- This is a question now. You did enter voluntarily into a sort of a contract relationship to receive those patients, right?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: So I would dispute that it's a contractual relationship.

THE COURT: You did enter into some sort of arrangement that was voluntary. That is, you didn't have to do it as a business?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: We voluntarily sought certification to provide, importantly, acute care or the five-day hold kind of treatment.

THE COURT: Let's just stick with acute care. And so you voluntarily entered into an arrangement to provide acute care, and not every health system in the state of Oregon did that, correct?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: It's my understanding, yes.

THE COURT: And you could tomorrow quit providing acute care if you decided it didn't fit your mission anymore, you didn't want to do it?

1 MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: I believe that is correct. 2 THE COURT: So, as I understand it, you want to make 3 distinction -- and I'll hear you out on that -- between the kind of care you said you agreed to provide and the kind of 4 5 care you're being asked to provide now. But in terms of the arrangement for acute care, it's voluntary, right? 6 7 MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: The arrangement for specifically acute care and the five-day hold is voluntary. 8 9 THE COURT: And if that acute care arrangement has 10 morphed into something you dislike for a variety of reasons --11 one, that you say you cannot do it; and two, because you don't 12 have the beds to even do it, or any other reason -- if it 13 morphs into something other than what you wanted to do when you 14 started down this path, then you could also just say, well, 15 then this isn't working for us anymore; we quit? 16 MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: So to the extent that the 17 nature of acute care --18 I want to hear you out on this, I really THE COURT: 19 But first I want a yes-no answer if that's possible. 20 it's not, then just tell me. But could you quit? 21 MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Yes. 22 THE COURT: Go ahead and finish your answer.

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Okay. So I think to say that acute care has morphed into something different, that's not what we allege in the complaint. We're distinguishing acute

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care as one particular kind of treatment as opposed to long-term care. And so this is not a question of whether acute care has morphed, it's that we've signed up to provide acute care and stabilizing care, and now as a result of us signing up for that kind of care, we are being forced to provide the latter type of care -- long-term treatment -- which we have not voluntarily agreed to provide.

And I think you can see this in the certificates that health systems have provided in our motion for judicial notice. If you look at the checkmarks that we have checked in that -in the various forms, there's distinguishing, you know -there's acute care options that you can check, there are five-day hold options you can check. Those are the boxes we checked. Now, there's also secure residential treatment care, which is long-term care, we continue that, but the Class 1 and 2 variety, none of the health systems checked that box. And so there is absolutely a situation that we have alleged in our complaint that's consistent with those forms in which we have been signed up to provide one type of care and now we are being required, and sort of OHA is outsourcing to us this latter type of care that was never part of our voluntary arrangement. And that's why we have not voluntarily -- we've not voluntarily taken on this interim level.

THE COURT: Why haven't you told OHA that you refuse?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: We have. And the reason that

1 nothing has happened is because there's nowhere for these 2 patients to go after the point where we cannot medically do 3 anything for them further, and Oregon law prohibits us from discharging patients in this situation unless they have a place 4 5 to go, provided that they are still in need of medical treatment, which these classifications are. 6 7 THE COURT: Thank you. 8 MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Thank you. So unless Your Honor has further questions --9 10 THE COURT: That's your core argument on voluntariness, right? 11 12 MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: That's correct. Thank you. I'll probably come back to 13 THE COURT: 14 you. 15 MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Thank you. 16 THE COURT: Your response, Ms. Scott? 17 MS. SCOTT: So plaintiffs allege that OHA is forcing 18 or requiring them to treat civilly committed patients on a 19 long-term basis, but they don't cite any law that shows they 20 are, in fact, required or forced to treat civilly committed 21 patients on a long-term basis. The Oregon Administrative Rules 22 provide to the contrary, that county mental health providers 23 have delegated authority to assign civilly committed patients 24 to appropriate facilities, that the receiving facility must

have space and consent to the placement. That is in OAR

309-033-0420.

We don't see anything in the complaint in which private hospitals are forced to treat these patients. There are no allegations that the hospitals have asked OHA for additional funding or that OHA has declined any request for additional funding to treat these patients.

So I think counsel said it pretty simply just now.

They could quit. So that, I think, means they have voluntarily assumed care for these patients on a long-term basis. So I think that is a fatal problem for their standing.

THE COURT: He says they told the hospital that they, in essence, refused to receive these patients and nothing changes. Why is that?

MS. SCOTT: I haven't seen that allegation in the amended complaint.

THE COURT: What about the allegation that is in the complaint, that they can't turn away people who show up on an emergency basis?

MS. SCOTT: I heard counsel say they cannot turn away patients if they need medical treatment. I didn't hear him cite the statute. I would be prepared to look at that and answer that. But the OAR does require their consent to admit a civilly committed patient. And so that is a separate consensual status, in addition to the certifications that they applied for and obtained.

1 THE COURT: And the certification is an additional indicia of voluntariness, in your view? 2 3 MS. SCOTT: It is. THE COURT: And that occurs every two years? 4 5 MS. SCOTT: I believe so. I'm not an expert on that, but I think the applications are in the record and the 6 7 certifications. THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 8 9 Do you wish to reply? MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: I would. 10 Thank you. 11 THE COURT: Why don't you read your note from 12 Mr. Johnson. 13 MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: If necessary. 14 THE COURT: (To Mr. Johnson) You're welcome to sit up 15 here if you like. Did you not iron your shirt today? 16 MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: All right. So I have a couple 17 of points I'd like to respond to here. 18 So first of all, I'd just like to revise my earlier 19 note about how we can't quit and whether we can or can't. So I 20 should point out that we do have emergency departments, and by 21 nature of having an emergency department, that's not the same 22 thing as an acute care inpatient facility. And so to the 23 extent we have emergency departments, we absolutely cannot 24 quit. And since some of our patients come in through that 25 doorway, we cannot stop providing services to those patients.

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THE COURT: When you say some of your patients come in through that doorway, you mean just generally from the community or do you mean some of these patients on whom you're seeking to litigate? MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: So -- both. THE COURT: Do you receive patients from OHA through ER? MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Yes. THE COURT: Civilly committed patients? MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: So they will not generally be civilly committed at the point of entry, but they will become civilly committed in our care. THE COURT: But otherwise the sort of patients that we've been talking about who release to your care, they don't arrive through the ER, do they? MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Some of them arrive through the ER, and others arrive into Unity Hospital, for instance, which has an emergency department and otherwise. THE COURT: But the requirement that you admit someone to the ER, that's separate from the voluntariness issue we're discussing today, isn't it? MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: It's not, because we have to treat and evaluate every patient who walks through our door, regardless of their ability to pay.

THE COURT: Again, you've suggested that we be a

little bit more precise about that. Not every patient who walks through your door. Every patient who walks through your ER, right?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: We have to treat -- we have to evaluate and treat, if needed, every patient who walks through our ER doors or the doors to our acute facilities, acute care facilities. That's under EMTALA. It's a federal statutory and regulatory regime that requires us to treat everyone and evaluate everyone regardless of their ability to pay. And so -- and that makes us kind of like the *Doe v. Shibinette* case, where New Hampshire law requires hospitals in that state to accept everyone who comes through the door, which is the basis of the Supreme Court, district court, and First Circuit's rejection of this argument that nothing is forcing those hospitals to provide treatment.

So I think it might help to just walk through here the track of a patient. But before I do that, I just wanted to just address the points counsel made. So it is in the complaint that we pleaded with OHA. It's in paragraph 46, where we've said that we have tried to address these issues with OHA for years and there's been no results.

And regarding the statutes that require us to continue to house patients who no longer are medically benefiting from our acute care and stabilizing services, that would be ORS 441.053 and 054, in addition to an OHA regulation

OAR 333-505-0055. Those laws require --

THE COURT: I'll pause you there. I'm concerned you're starting to shove your private note up onto the screen. I'd like you not to do that.

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: I apologize, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So what do those say?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: What does what?

THE COURT: What do those regulations and statutes

say?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: So those regulations say that when a patient is receiving behavioral health treatment from our hospitals, we cannot discharge them unless it was in accordance with a created discharge policy and plan that considers the individual needs of our patients. And so if our doctors have determined that our patients need further treatment, but that treatment cannot be provided in our hospitals but there's nowhere for those patients to go outside of our hospitals, those patients get stuck in sort of this limbo where they can't go elsewhere, they can't be discharged to the sidewalk, and so -- but we can't really do anything medically. We can't provide them the long-term treatment that they need medically. And so that's the kinds of patients that we're talking about here.

THE COURT: So on voluntariness, let's assume it goes like this, that OHA sends you a patient and it's really not for

acute care or it long outlasts acute care into the sort of long-term care that you say you're not equipped to provide. So you call up OHA and you say, "We don't think we should have this patient. You shouldn't have sent this patient here in the first place," and OHA says -- I know it's not what's happening, so that's why it's a hypothetical.

OHA says, "You're right, that patient shouldn't be there." And then by operation of these other principles and laws, you realize you can't discharge the patient.

Is that laid at the feet of OHA making your continued care for that patient involuntary or is that separate from OHA because it is statutes on the books drafted by the legislature?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: So please correct me if I'm misunderstanding your question. We do allege that the buck ultimately stops with OHA to ensure that long-term treatment is provided to these civilly --

THE COURT: I can phrase it more simply, I guess. If OHA says, "We don't need you to keep these patients anymore," but you keep them anyway because of what you've just described, that you decide that they still need care and there's no place else for them to go, does that make OHA's and your problem involuntary by you, or does OHA's decision to go ahead and let you bow out make it something else?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: So, again, I apologize -THE COURT: What I'm asking is if it's Oregon

1 legislative enactments that make you keep this patient --2 MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Yes. 3 THE COURT: -- and not your arrangement with OHA. recognize it's all the State of Oregon, so that's my question. 4 5 Are you in the same position, it doesn't matter whether OHA is making you keep them or state legislative enactments are making 6 7 you keep them? Is it all the same to you? MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: 8 It's the state legislative 9 enactments that are making us keep these patients. It's also 10 OHA's regulations. It's both of those. If OHA were to 11 decide -- I don't think that they are truly taking the position 12 that we should be discharging patients who are in need of care 13 to the sidewalk despite their needs, despite the fact that 14 they're still a danger to themselves and others and unable to 15 care for the basic needs. Even if they were to take that 16 position and say just discharge them, we would still be 17 obligated to follow Oregon statute, which OHA can't override. We would have to also follow EMTALA. So there's several 18 19 provisions at play here, including but not limited to OHA's 20 regulations and directives. 21 THE COURT: One of them you mentioned was federal 22 law, right? 23 MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Correct. 24 THE COURT: That, of course, can't be laid at the

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feet of the State, right?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Repeat, please.

THE COURT: That, of course, cannot be laid at the feet of the State in any way, right?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: I think not literally, no, but effectively --

THE COURT: Well, literally it can't be laid at their feet in any way, because it's a metaphor, that's true.

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: It can't be directly -- so that is an operation of federal law, but that is, you know, when you're talking about voluntariness, we're talking about the overall framework, which includes state law, federal law, and regulatory provisions. And so the -- just the fact that it's a federal law does not somehow absolve OHA of its statutory obligation to civilly committed patients.

THE COURT: Well, I'm just looking at whether you're suffering a harm that you could cease suffering by your own actions. That's the standing question. So I'm not looking at a big framework. I'm just looking at do you have a way out where you could quit suffering this harm. So if you have a way out and you keep suffering the harm, then you don't have standing to complain. And you're saying -- you've essentially told me today you don't have a way out.

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: We're saying we don't have a way out. Again, going back to the fact that we have to accept patients through our emergency department, and that is not

something that is subject to our certification as a voluntary participation in providing involuntary treatment.

THE COURT: Well, I guess it just strikes me even from your complaint that the path to your client health systems isn't typically through the ER. Am I wrong about that?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: It happens. I don't have the numbers or the proportions about how many come through ER versus into acute inpatient facilities directly, but it's a mix, and we're talking about both avenues here.

THE COURT: And I guess I thought you were saying a minute ago that it really doesn't matter which it is, that one way or another, you cannot discharge these patients.

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: So our position is that it doesn't matter to the extent that you find the voluntariness component of the acute care provision, if that, you think, is voluntary, we can avoid that. That doesn't change the fact that the emergency room situation is what it is, and that's not voluntary.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Now, we -- with the acute care, we contend that that's still not voluntary because we have a right to provide the kind of treatment that we go into business to provide, which in our case is acute care and stabilizing treatment.

THE COURT: You have a right to provide acute care to

these patients?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: What I mean by that is to say that in the same way that, you know, a doctor specializes in a certain kind of care, you don't fault the doctor for not providing every type of care in the universe, and we can go -- we provide one type of care that doesn't require us to provide every type of care, every type of behavioral health care that exists.

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. NEIMAN: Judge Mosman, I'm here to talk about the merits after the standing issue is addressed, but I can speak to the pathways that the patients follow.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. NEIMAN: So first of all, these -- sorry.

THE COURT: You can be seated. That's fine.

MR. NEIMAN: First of all, these patients do not come to the hospitals we represent through OHA, nor are they generally discharged from Oregon State Hospital to our hospitals. These are people who are in the community who decompensate psychiatrically, brought usually by law enforcement, sometimes by family, sometimes by public officials to our hospital emergency departments. And there are about 7,000 of them, more than 7,000 every year.

Once they reach the emergency department, EMTALA takes over, and the hospital emergency departments have to

evaluate the patients by what's called a medical screening exam for any kind of condition, including a psychiatric condition, which is specifically covered by federal law. If that patient is psychiatrically unstable and dangerous to self or others as part of that definition, that patient cannot be discharged without violating federal law. And that happens, as I said, across the state more than 7,000 times a year.

At that point, what the State is not recognizing is when a notice of mental illness, initiating a bed of a civil commitment proceeding is placed, that patient is no longer just a hospital patient. That patient is within the State's mental health system. It's the responsibility of the State. And the core of our complaint is that at that point in time when those 7,000 people who are detained pursuant to the civil commitment laws are kept in the hospital involuntarily every year, at that point they cannot be released, and it's the State's responsibility to move forward with civil commitment proceedings to determine whether they meet the statutory standards.

THE COURT: And the core of your complaint is that that doesn't happen and you keep them?

MR. NEIMAN: Correct.

THE COURT: If I understand you correctly so far, the ER is really -- predates, at least if it predates civil commitment, it predates the complaint that you have with the

1 State here? 2 In the emergency department, for the MR. NEIMAN: 3 patients who meet detention criteria, a notice of mental illness is placed. 4 5 You told me that. What I'm asking is THE COURT: doesn't all of that predate typically by at least a few hours, 6 7 if not a few days, civil commitment?

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MR. NEIMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: And it's upon civil commitment that you have the complaint in front of me that says the State should be taking over here and they're not. They're making you keep these patients, right?

MR. NEIMAN: Well, no. Because for many of those patients, our hospitals welcome the opportunity to --

THE COURT: Sure. But at some point that's the population from which you get the patients that form the gravamen of this complaint, right?

MR. NEIMAN: Right. At some point --

THE COURT: My only question was then the ER doorway that we've described really predates any relationship that you have, arrangement, certification, or voluntariness with OHA, right?

MR. NEIMAN: Except for the fact that we're licensed as hospitals. As soon as somebody is detained by way of a notice of mental illness, there's a set of administrative

rules.

THE COURT: All sorts of people arrive at your ER, and some of them later are going to become the patients who form the subject of this complaint and some won't, right?

MR. NEIMAN: Correct.

THE COURT: And for those first few days, we don't know what's going to happen yet until they become civilly committed, right?

MR. NEIMAN: That's right.

THE COURT: So until they become civilly committed, your complaint -- this complaint -- doesn't really apply yet, right?

MR. NEIMAN: Right. Our complaint is directed to the smaller group of people who are civilly committed after a hearing and who have reached the point where they're no longer benefiting from being in the hospital.

THE COURT: That's very helpful. Thank you.

But I guess the follow-up question I have is then the voluntariness or not of people who show up at your ER is a different subject than the subject matter of this complaint, because it applies to a whole set of people who may or may not end up in this complaint, right?

MR. NEIMAN: There's a complicated answer to that simple question having to do with possible alternative places for people to go besides emergency departments, but the answer

to what you're asking is, the period of time before the civil commitment order is entered is not part of our complaint. It's part of the flow of events that leads to our complaint.

THE COURT: Sure. All right. Thank you very much.

MR. NEIMAN: And then I wonder if the Court has any questions about -- any more questions about the hospital's ability to discharge people legally once they've reached the point where the hospital can't provide any more care to them that's going to benefit them, because that's what our case is about.

THE COURT: So I've heard your colleague's explanation. Do you wish to amplify it?

MR. NEIMAN: Not unless the Court has any questions. I thought he did a great job.

THE COURT: Thank you. No, I don't.

Ms. Scott.

MS. SCOTT: I don't have anything further unless the Court has specific questions.

THE COURT: So I do. On voluntariness, then, at the risk of oversimplifying it, there are three, at least, time periods to think about voluntariness, because what I'm asking, what I'm really asking isn't so much a question of whether medical care can or cannot be provided but whether the harm that's alleged in this complaint can be evaded through some voluntary action. And so there's multiple spots in time in

which the harm theoretically could be evaded. One is not to enter into any certification relationship with OHA, because that's voluntarily entered into, right?

MS. SCOTT: Correct.

THE COURT: And that's the core of your briefed argument is that since that relationship is one that health systems entered into voluntarily, they could just not do that and therefore not suffer the harm. Right?

MS. SCOTT: That's right.

THE COURT: And the argument you've heard is that well, that's not quite true that we could cease to be in that sort of relationship but still be obligated to receive patients and treat them. I guess so far my impression is that not entering into this certification relationship with OHA might not change the picture much as to who shows up at the hospital for treatment. Do you agree?

MS. SCOTT: I do agree. I believe federal law is what requires the private hospitals to screen in an ER setting and evaluate and stabilize the patient before transferring them. It does not require a private hospital to admit a civilly committed or someone who may be civilly committed on a long-term basis.

THE COURT: All right. The second point is the one counsel just mentioned, and that is that at some point along the way of the total number of thousands of people who show up

at the ER, some number of them are going to be civilly committed. Right?

MS. SCOTT: Yes.

THE COURT: And then your client does step into the picture in some way. Correct?

MS. SCOTT: OHA, once they're civilly committed,
OHA -- OHA is responsible for them once they are civilly
committed, correct.

THE COURT: And here we come closer to the timetable you've briefed, and that is your idea is that if they're civilly committed, starting with the need for acute care, you are only going to send them -- or place them, rather, for treatment with a facility that has entered into this certification relationship with OHA. Is that correct?

MS. SCOTT: I think that's right. The way the placement decision happens is that OHA has delegated its placement authority to the county mental healthcare providers. They then make a placement decision, and sometimes it is with a private hospital, but the private hospital still has to consent under the Oregon Administrative Rules to such a placement.

THE COURT: Another way to think about it is if this all happened, someone showed up at the ER and then they got civilly committed, and it so happens that the hospital whose ER they showed up to isn't in this certification relationship, then it would be either impossible or at least unlikely that

they'd be placed for treatment there. Is that right?

MS. SCOTT: It would be the hospital's choice at that point what to do with the patient. There's no state law forcing them to admit or not admit them at that stage.

THE COURT: Only federal law?

MS. SCOTT: Yes. And federal law only requires the ER treatment. It does not require long-term admission.

THE COURT: And then the last stage of the timetable is that they've been placed for treatment for whatever reason, and the hospital's ability to provide any further acute treatment has come to the end. The hospital feels that they are not in a position to provide long-term care or treatment of any kind for this category of patient. And here they argue that a variety of laws require them, if there's no other alternative, to continue to house such patients. In other words, they argue that it's involuntarily now their responsibility to keep these patients.

MS. SCOTT: The laws that I heard counsel cite all involve emergent situations, emergency medical issues, emergencies, not a long-term care issue. So I don't think anything -- if a patient is not experiencing an emergency, then there's nothing preventing a private hospital from choosing to not continue the relationship.

THE COURT: Discharging -- so you contend that these patients that are the subject of this complaint at the back

end, when the hospital says, our acute phase of treatment is over, we didn't sign up for anything else, nor are we capable of giving it, you're contending the hospitals are completely free, at least under state law, to discharge these patients out into the community?

MS. SCOTT: That's right. It's my understanding that as professional treatment centers, they don't want to do that because it's not the right thing to do. And the State doesn't want them to do that necessarily either, but there's no legal requirement preventing them from alleviating the concerns that they have vis-a-vis their own financial situation with having these patients in their beds.

THE COURT: So your voluntariness argument, not to put too fine a point on it, is that they could avoid the harm of continued care of these patients by doing the one thing no one wants them to do?

MS. SCOTT: It's a tough situation to be in, but that is correct.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

MR. NEIMAN: Judge Mosman, that argument reflects a misinterpretation of the detailed Oregon Administrative Rules that apply to the civil commitment process. Only a directer of a community mental health program can place an individual who has been civilly committed in a certified hospital, and it is incorrect to say that a hospital which has somebody admitted

there who is sick and unstable and under an order of civil commitment can choose to discharge that person because it feels like it. That violates the federal conditions of participation for Medicare-participating hospitals. And I'm surprised to hear that from Oregon Health Authority, which takes custody --

THE COURT: To be more precise about it, she was careful to say that no state law requires it.

MR. NEIMAN: Well, the provisions of ORS Chapter 426, and specifically ORS 426.060 and ORS 426.150, require the Oregon Health Authority to take custody of somebody who has been civilly committed, and deliver that person to a place for treatment. The idea that after that delivery and while the person is still civilly committed, still meets commitment criteria, it's very surprising to hear from Oregon Health Authority that they would endorse discharge from a hospital of somebody who is under an order of civil commitment.

THE COURT: Fair enough. But what you've recited tells me that Oregon Health Authority can never walk away from its commitment to civilly committed patients, but it doesn't tell me that you have a legal obligation to either accept or continue to care for these patients.

MR. NEIMAN: Well --

THE COURT: Do you?

MR. NEIMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Other than federal law?

1 MR. NEIMAN: Yes. The hospital, community hospital which has a patient who is -- meets civil commitment criteria 2 3 and is unstable and is unsafe to leave, which is what meeting civil criteria means, cannot simply discharge that person. 4 5 Ever? THE COURT: MR. NEIMAN: Well, until they're stable or there's a 6 7 place to transfer them. THE COURT: So not stable, never. That's your 8 9 position? 10 MR. NEIMAN: Correct. 11 THE COURT: That's what law requires? 12 MR. NEIMAN: That's right. As long as the individual meets civil commitment criteria, a hospital which has that 13 14 individual as a patient can't discharge that person. 15 Now, there is a procedure for somebody to not be 16 civilly committed anymore, but that's not the group of people 17 we're talking about here. 18 THE COURT: And just so I'm clear, your position is 19 that if this whole arrangement became no longer viable for your 20 client and they chose simply to end this certification 21 relationship with OHA, that wouldn't change much? 22 MR. NEIMAN: It would not. 23 Because if they came in through the ER THE COURT: 24 and were in an acute phase and you cared for them through the 25 acute phase, there are other laws separate from the

certification arrangement that would require their continued care unless they either were stabilized or there was some community placement that was viable?

MR. NEIMAN: The certifications allow the hospital to provide certain services to people who are civilly committed over a short period of time. They -- there's nothing that anyone has cited to you, nor does anything exist in the Oregon Administrative Rules or anywhere else that says that the certifications that our clients have accepted obligate them or relate in any way to long-term care.

THE COURT: No, that's not my question. My question is if you ended the certification relationship -- because that's what your opponent's brief has suggested is a viable option for you. If you don't like how this is going, then you can just voluntarily withdraw from this business relationship. If you did that, would you then be in a position to no longer be suffering the harm you've alleged in your complaint?

MR. NEIMAN: Basically no.

THE COURT: Why not?

MR. NEIMAN: Because the patients would still be hospital patients and they would still be part of the state mental health system.

THE COURT: So what does the certification relationship accomplish if it doesn't distinguish between hospitals who have entered into it and those that don't?

MR. NEIMAN: It allows certain regulated services to be provided, such as acute stabilization, which is one of the certifications that our clients have, which --

THE COURT: So if someone showed up at a hospital that didn't enter into this relationship and that patient needed acute stabilization services but the hospital to which this person arrived hadn't entered into this certification relationship, what would happen to that patient?

MR. NEIMAN: Well, that happens all the time.

THE COURT: What would happen?

MR. NEIMAN: I can tell you generally what happens is the patient is held in the hospital emergency department of uncertified hospitals, and then eventually transferred to a hospital that can provide the level of service that the initial hospital could not.

THE COURT: Before you move on, why doesn't that then tell me if you retreated from this certification relationship that you would no longer have to receive these patients and you could send them to a hospital who wished to do so?

MR. NEIMAN: Could I ask the Court to repeat that question?

THE COURT: You just told me that what happens, what distinguishes hospitals who have entered into this certification relationship from those who don't, is that if someone shows up at the ER of the hospital who hasn't entered

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into this certification relationship, that typically that patient, short or long term, eventually get transferred to a hospital who has. So why wouldn't that happen to your clients if they retreated, ceased being in this relationship? Why wouldn't they then be at liberty, upon receiving patients like this, to send them to a different hospital? MR. NEIMAN: They wish to be certified to provide acute care services. THE COURT: Of course they wish that, but if they decided that wish was costing them too much money and they got out, wouldn't they then be able to send patients to a different hospital? MR. NEIMAN: No, because there isn't any capacity. And that's what our case is about. THE COURT: You just told me a minute ago that what typically happens is that if a hospital isn't certified, the patient that we've just been talking about gets sent to a hospital that is certified. So isn't that what happens? MR. NEIMAN: For the hospitals that are not certified, yes. They send them to a hospital that is? THE COURT: MR. NEIMAN: Or the patient gets better enough in that hospital to not need to be transferred. Fair enough. So if that's what happens, THE COURT:

then why isn't it the case that if you bowed out, said we don't

want to be certified anymore, you wouldn't have to maintain these patients over any significant period of time? You could send them to a hospital that was certified.

MR. NEIMAN: Because what our clients want to do and what they signed up to do is acute care. And for that --

THE COURT: I don't mean to minimize that answer, because I'm grateful that you have clients like this who want to do this, and there's a desperate need for it. And I'm not convinced that the answer that might be -- that might be required by standing doctrine is anything but a terrible answer. Nevertheless, haven't you just told me that you could avoid this harm by just getting out of this game entirely and punting it to somebody else? I know you have told me your clients don't want to do that -- God bless them for that -- but couldn't they get out of this game entirely and punt the problem to somebody else and avoid the harm you're suffering as alleged in the complaint?

MR. NEIMAN: I don't think they could, Your Honor, because --

THE COURT: Why not?

MR. NEIMAN: There isn't anywhere else to send the patients.

THE COURT: The struggle I have with that answer is when you answered my other question a minute ago, you said, "I'm going to tell you what actually happens," and you told me

if the hospital is not certified, they ship their patients to somebody else.

MR. NEIMAN: Those aren't our hospitals.

THE COURT: I know that. We wouldn't be here if they were. Thank you for your answer.

Let's move on to the substance of health systems' claims on behalf of health systems. The first is a substantive due process claim. I don't think I need to hear more argument on that one.

And it is correct, isn't it, that -- that's claim 2.

And it is correct, isn't it, that the procedural due process
element of claim 2 you've essentially walked away from, right?

MR. NEIMAN: We haven't briefed it.

THE COURT: All right. Fair enough.

So the Fifth Amendment takings claim requires me to find that there's a physical taking of your beds by this regulatory -- by this state action.

You'd agree, wouldn't you, that that issue stands or falls on the same voluntariness question? If you win on voluntariness on standing, then you win it on Fifth Amendment taking. And if you lose it, if I find that you're -- that you could voluntarily get out of this harm, then you lose the Fifth Amendment takings claim as well. Right? I'm not asking about the merits. I'm just asking doesn't the Fifth Amendment takings claim stand or fall on voluntariness?

1 MR. NEIMAN: So the Court is talking about the voluntary participation doctrine, I think. 2 3 THE COURT: I am. MR. NEIMAN: We're actually talking about both a 4 5 physical and a regulatory taking. 6 I guess I missed the regulatory taking THE COURT: 7 claim. MR. NEIMAN: That has to do with the Oregon 8 9 Administrative --10 THE COURT: I know what it has to do with. I just 11 didn't see it in your complaint. Where is it? MR. NEIMAN: It has to do --12 13 THE COURT: Let's start with this. I love labels. 14 Is there a claim anywhere in this complaint that says 15 "regulatory taking"? 16 MR. NEIMAN: No. THE COURT: All right. Is there any other paragraph 17 18 in which you claim regulatory taking? 19 MR. NEIMAN: The claim is by operation of the civil 20 commitment system through a set of complex regulations that 21 Oregon Health Authority is commandeering community hospital 22 beds. 23 THE COURT: Right. They're taking your beds, which 24 you've said is a property takings claim, right? 25 The line between -- in the cases MR. NEIMAN: Right.

between a physical taking and a regulatory taking is not always clear.

THE COURT: Again, I'm aware of that. I'm only asking what you've pled.

MR. NEIMAN: Well, we tried to allege, I think, both a regulatory and a physical taking under the Fifth Amendment.

THE COURT: Did you brief a regulatory taking in response to the motion to dismiss? Did you cite any regulatory takings cases?

MR. NEIMAN: I believe we did, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I'll turn to your opponent then on these substantive issues.

Anything you wish to add?

MS. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honor.

With respect to whether they briefed a regulatory taking, we point out in our brief that they did not address the three-factor test for a regulatory taking. They didn't identify any distinct investment-backed expectations, let alone describe to any degree the economic impact of the alleged state conduct or the extent to which the conduct has interfered with any distinct investment-backed expectations.

I would also add that with respect to whether the takings claim rises and falls on the voluntariness issue, I think it also falls on the relief they're seeking. They're not seeking just compensation. They haven't asked the State for

additional money. They're seeking a widespread injunction stopping the taking from happening in the first place, which would -- takings law does generally not allow the injunction. The remedy is compensation. And so I think that's another reason why the taking claim fails.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. NEIMAN: We have found the place in our brief where we spoke to the regulatory takings cases, Your Honor. It's on pages 33 and 34.

THE COURT: And you walk through the three-part test?

MR. NEIMAN: No.

THE COURT: Penn Central?

MR. NEIMAN: No.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Let's talk about standing to bring the claim on behalf of third parties. One issue is the same standing issue we've already discussed, but there's a second issue, the sort of close relation to a third party that's been developed in case law as a correspondence of interest.

What's your argument on that?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: So, Your Honor, our argument for the close relationship, so a close relationship as discussed in the *Singleton v. Wulff* opinion from 1976, explains that there's two aspects of that relationship. One is whether the right of the third party is inextricably bound up with the

activity the litigant wishes to pursue. And I don't think there's any dispute that that prong of the close relationship test is met here.

Now, then there's a second prong of that test under Singleton, which discusses whether the -- whether the litigant -- here hospitals -- is as good as or nearly as good as an advocate for the rights of the third party. And here that is met -- so there's multiple ways to meet that prong, and this is getting to the -- sort of what it means to be in an alignment of interests here, a correspondence of interests.

So for one, the relationship between a health care provider and a patient is such a relationship that is confidential and fiduciary in nature, that under the case law that has been deemed sufficient for a close relationship in numerous cases involving doctors asserting claims of patients, in addition to other entities like universities or vendors asserting claims on behalf of students and customers. Now, that's one way you can have a sufficient close relationship. Another way is where you can -- even if there's not a preexisting literal relationship between human beings, if you have a situation where government conduct is equally or simultaneously affecting two groups in mostly the same way, then there's an alignment of interest there.

So, for instance, in the *Singleton v. Wulff* case, for example, you had a Medicaid provision that removed Medicaid

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funding for abortion services. That affected doctors because they wouldn't get paid for those services and it affected patients as well simultaneously because those patients were foreclosed off from receiving certain care. And because those alignments were -- those interests were aligned, there was a close relationship.

Here it's a similar situation because OHA is failing to ensure that patients in our hospitals get the long-term treatment they need, and we can't provide any further acute stabilizing care for them, but they can't move on until they are -- have that long-term care provided for them. And as a result of their -- of our inability to discharge them, that's where our property deprivation comes into play. So the only way to cure that property deprivation is for our patients to have long-term treatment available to them either in the Oregon State Hospital system or elsewhere, including in long-term secure residential treatment facilities across Oregon.

So because the only way that our patients can receive, you know, the only way that everybody can win is that for our patients to receive the care to which they're constitutionally entitled, and when that happens, then our property deprivation will cease. So in that way, because all of this comes from the same conduct by OHA, our interests are aligned in the same way that doctors and patients are aligned in, for instance, Singleton v. Wulff and other case law.

THE COURT: Your briefing, though, has described a divergence, right? I mean, your briefing describes the patients as a financial and other burden on your clients.

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: So I would disagree that that creates a divergence of interest here, because what matters is not the fact that there's an ongoing property deprivation while these patients are in our care and not able to receive or benefit from our services. What matters is the relief we are seeking, which is for the outcome of this lawsuit will result in either both patients and hospitals gaining or not. There's not a situation where there's a conflict insofar as hospitals can gain where civilly committed patients do not gain or they lose.

THE COURT: What if as a result of this lawsuit the State says, dealing with the lawsuit by health systems is a headache we don't need, so we will find another place for these patients and we won't burden health systems with these patients any longer, with that other place chosen by OHA isn't as good as the hospitals. And your clients, I assume, would walk away at this point, right?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: If OHA were to take that sort of remarkable position --

THE COURT: It's not remarkable at all. They have multiple options. You're the best option in their view right now, so they don't like a lawsuit, so they pick a not as good

an option just to get you off their back. It happens every day in litigation. Your clients would be satisfied, right? All your clients' interests would be satisfied.

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: In that situation --

THE COURT: It's really just a matter of saying your clients' interests in this litigation are entirely satisfied if these patients go away.

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Under the current regulatory and statutory framework, I just don't think that it's possible, because even if OHA was -- I think --

THE COURT: Something other than your clients has to be possible because that's why you brought this lawsuit.

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: The way out of this situation is for there to be more services that are constitutionally appropriate for our patients, and until that happens --

THE COURT: Believe me, I'm aware that that halcyon day is the way out, but it's not going to happen tomorrow. And so let's say the State says, well, we're not there yet nor will we ever be there in the lifetime of care of some of these patients, so we've got to do something else. It's just straightforward, right? It's a hard question but a simple one. Your clients' lawsuit has to be satisfied if somebody else takes cares of these patients.

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: That would -- our position is that in order for somebody else to take care of these patients,

it has to be constitutionally adequate, and until that happens, our interests are aligned. It's not enough to just say that these issues can be fixed tomorrow. We don't -- we're not contending that they can be. What is important is that their rights are not being met, and it's not enough to simply say funding is short or space is short. And so, by law, we cannot simply allow for patients in our custody who we have medical and legal duties to provide medical treatments and to do no harm, we cannot simply allow for those patients to be sent outside of our hospital if that would hurt them or would be bad for them or against their medical interests.

THE COURT: What place, if any, does DRO play in this analysis?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: So DRO certainly has the authority to, under the PAIMI Act, to advocate for specific groups that they choose to represent. But because in this litigation, in the Mink-Bowman case and here in the -- in our lawsuit, they have chosen to represent aid-and-assist patients and expressly seek for those patients, aid-and-assist patients, to be prioritized over civilly committed patients. That precludes them from having -- from being proper advocates of civilly committed patients here.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. SCOTT: Just a couple of responses.

Case 6:22-cv-01460-AN

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The four cases that plaintiff's counsel cites for the close relationship are doctor-patient relationships. Plaintiffs -- hospitals are not in a doctor-patient relationship with the patients whose rights they're asserting.

The case that we believe is on all fours with this situation is Siskiyou Hospital v. California Department of Health Care Services. It's almost an identical fact pattern. And the Court there found there was not a close relationship because they were two steps removed from the patient, between the patient, the doctor, and the hospital. The case is fully briefed in our motion to dismiss and reply and also in DRO's amicus brief.

THE COURT: What about the idea that in this litigation if health systems win, the patients sort of in pari passu win to the same degree?

I heard counsel saying that if the health MS. SCOTT: systems win, there's no current place for the patients to go. So I don't see how they could win. We're not hearing from the civilly committed patients about where they want to be right There is, as Your Honor knows, a capacity challenge throughout the state's behavioral system because there isn't a voice for where these patients could go right now, and the private hospitals, from their complaint and their brief, want an injunction prohibiting OHA from placing them in the private

1 hospitals. Their interests are not aligned at this juncture. 2 Thank you very much. THE COURT: 3 MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Reply, Your Honor? THE COURT: Go ahead. Thank you. 4 5 MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: I want to clarify we are not seeking an injunction here for patients not to be placed with 6 7 That's exactly the opposite of what we're looking for. And this is actually a good way to discuss the Siskiyou 8 Hospital case, because in that case --9 10 THE COURT: What are you seeking? 11 MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: We're seeking an injunction for OHA to cease the -- its unconstitutional practices, which 12 13 includes requiring OHA to provide services, these long-term 14 service options in the community so that our patients can get 15 that treatment that they cannot get at our hospitals. 16 THE COURT: You want me to enjoin whom to do what? Imagine that I'm signing a one-page document that tells 17 18 somebody to do something. What does it tell them to do? 19 MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: Well, so that gets into relief 20 questions that, you know, I think we're still at the early 21 stages of litigation, but in essence, we're seeking an 22 injunction for OHA to create these resources where they're

not -- they do not now exist. And so now I understand that

it still needs to happen. And that's the basis --

that can't happen overnight, and we don't contend it can, but

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THE COURT: If I enjoined OHA with all deliberate speed to build out new facilities, what relief would you be seeking in the interim for your clients?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: You know, I think there would be a lot of specifics to hash out that I'm not prepared to commit to at this point, but we would have, you know, discussions about -- we could litigate the specifics about sort of what to do.

THE COURT: You act like this is a future question, but it's a very important question for my analysis here today. Are you seeking in the interim -- well, would you be taking the position in the interim that you'd keep receiving these patients until new facilities were built out, or would you be asking that they be sent somewhere else?

MR. VAN RYSSELBERGHE: I believe we would keep taking these patients, Your Honor. We're not asking for them to be sent elsewhere.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Go ahead.

MR. STENSON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. I don't think I have too much to add.

I do think that Your Honor has hit the nail on the head in terms of the obvious conflict. We are currently dealing with the realities of a system with limited resources, and it's very likely in that system of limited resources that

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any possible settlement between the Oregon Health Authority and the hospital corporations, should this be allowed to proceed, would balance in some way the speed of getting patients out of the hospitals versus the quality of the places they've actually been moving into. You know, if the -- I'm not saying this is something OHA would necessarily do, but if OHA said, we want to get rid of this immediately, we'll move people into homeless shelters, they could do that really fast, but the quality of services wouldn't be great. And between, you know, very poor, nontherapeutic settings like homeless shelters and, you know, really excellent residential, you know, services, either that the clients would want and would benefit from, there's a whole spectrum of possible outcomes. So if the hospital's vested interest is getting patients out quickly, you know, in whatever format, that's their individual interest and that doesn't aliqu with the interest of patients. So I'm concerned that if they're permitted to stand in the shoes of the patients, that that's a scenario that we'll

So I'm concerned that if they're permitted to stand in the shoes of the patients, that that's a scenario that we'll be entertaining in the future, that there will be some outcome, some alternative placement which will balance strongly in favor of getting people out quickly versus getting them to the placement they need to be. That's the nature of a conflict of interest, Your Honor.

In terms of the third-party standing questions, the hospital corporations have indicated that there's some sort of

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per se relationship because somebody has a doctor-patient relationship, as in *Singleton*. But that's clearly not enough standing on its own just to be a doctor and a patient or just to be a healthcare corporation who is providing -- who is paying the people who are providing services to a patient, because doctors get sued by their patients all the time. Providence or Legacy get sued by patients all the time. So clearly their interests are not always aliqued. And, in fact, in the Supreme Court jurisprudence on this, the Supreme Court has focused on the actual interests of the parties relative to the case at bar, not simply to the proximity of the relationship.

In Newdow, the Supreme Court said a father couldn't have third-party standing to represent his daughter, and there's no relationship in the law that's more privileged than the relationship between a parent and a child. So clearly when we're talking about third-party standing, we're talking not just about is there a vendor-vendee relationship, is there a doctor-patient relationship, is there an attorney-client relationship, another relationship that the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected for per se third-party standing. Clearly it's whether the actual interests are aligned. And it really radiates out from the briefing how much the relationship between the healthcare corporations' interests are not aligned with that of their patients.

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So I think it's certainly part of the analysis to say what's the nature of that relationship, but there is certainly no per se close relationship simply because one is a healthcare provider or a healthcare corporation and the third party is a patient.

And in terms of what's being sought, I'm a bit perplexed at this notion that no one before this Court has ever asked for OHA to expand the realm of its offerings so that patients don't have to live in restrictive settings, because that's all that DRO and MPD have been doing for the last four years is to ask this Court for relief that would expand the availability of those resources.

THE COURT: Do you agree with the argument that you're in a difficult position vis-a-vis civilly committed patients by virtue of the relief you're seeking for aid-and-assist?

MR. STENSON: I do not agree with that, Your Honor. That is common to a wide variety of -- any time you have more than one client, there are individual challenges, you know. we have challenges where, you know, if some patient has been in for 40 days, another patient has been in for 12 days, both of those patients want to get out. And so we have to set some timeline that says we're going to prioritize people who have been in longer. We have to have some concept and some prioritization. The fact that there's some prioritization

doesn't create an actual conflict of interest. And, in fact, any attorney who tries to represent a group of patients will have challenges around exactly the mechanism of how, you know, access to whatever the monetary or injunctive relief is, how that's prioritized among the individuals in that group. So that's not unique to DRO or to MPD or to any other representative organization, and we have pressed for the development of those resources, and if those resources are developed, they will be available to people in civil commitment, they'll be available to people who are on aid-and-assist commitments, they'll be accessible to people who are on GEI.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

I want to turn to the motion for clarification on intervention. A lot of it centers on things we've already discussed, but there's also a timeliness question. So do you wish to be heard further on the absence of meeting the timeliness prong?

MR. STENSON: Your Honor, I would just say that, you know, the issue at stake in terms of the prioritization, as has been roundly attested to throughout the briefing, that's a phenomenon that's been ongoing since 2019, and so it's unclear why this should be considered a timely intervention to seek to finally address this issue four years into the process. And I would say, you know, the multiple cases that were cited show

that there's a strong disposition in the Ninth Circuit not to allow this kind of waiting until some sort of settlement has been struck, you know, staying out of that process, staying out of the work of trying to engage in settlement, and then complaining when somebody does, you know, resolve their dispute. So I think in this case there was a clear opportunity to intervene at any point in the last four years.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Do you wish to be heard on timeliness?

MR. NEIMAN: It is remarkable that -- now we're talking about the Mink case?

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. NEIMAN: That case has been going on for 22 years, and the first time that anybody brought the impact of an interconnected mental health system to the Court's attention was in September of last year, in terms of representation and giving a voice to civilly committed individuals. It wasn't until September of last year that this Court entered its order, and there was no effort to include -- by the parties to the case to bring the State's community hospitals to the table. So as soon as the order that the Court entered was issued, we were in court intervening within a month. That, we think, speaks to prompt action once there was something to act on.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Do you wish to reply?

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MR. STENSON: I mean, the notion that it was incumbent on either OHA or DRO or MPD to send an invitation to the hospitals to participate is just absurd and without foundation. It's clear in the Ninth Circuit case law that it is incumbent on the party to vindicate their own interest, to show up and to be vigilant in pursuing it, not to wait until an order is entered and then oppose it. That's thoroughly briefed. So the idea that there's some privilege to wait until an order is entered, and only then act, is rebutted by voluminous case law on this exact point. Thank you all very much. I'll get you my THE COURT: answer as soon as possible. We'll be in recess. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. Court is in recess. (Proceedings concluded at 2:28 p.m.)

--000--I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause. A transcript without an original signature or conformed signature is not certified. /s/Bonita J. Shumway April 28, 2023 BONITA J. SHUMWAY, CSR, RMR, CRR DATE Official Court Reporter

| 301 [1] 3/4 309-033-0420 [1] 15/1 | acknowledge [1] 5/24 across [5] 7/23 10/1 10/2 25/7 44/17 |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | |
| | + FAT AZIAE EDIO EEIOO EGIO |
| 326-8188 [1] 3/5 33 [1] 42/9 | act [4] 47/15 50/9 55/23 56/9 action [6] 6/12 6/15 6/18 28/25 39/17 |
| 333-505-0055 [1] 19/1 | 55/23 |
| 34 [1] 42/9 | actions [1] 22/17 |
| 3:02-cv-00339-MO [1] 1/4 | activity [1] 43/1 |
| | actual [3] 52/10 52/22 54/1 |
| | actually [4] 38/25 40/4 49/8 51/4 acute [35] 10/19 11/16 11/18 11/19 |
| | 11/24 12/6 12/8 12/9 12/17 12/24 12/25 |
| 4 | 13/2 13/3 13/12 16/22 18/6 18/6 18/24 |
| 40 [1] 53/21 | 20/1 20/1 23/8 23/15 23/20 23/23 23/25 |
| | 30/11 31/10 32/1 34/24 34/25 36/2 36/6 |
| | 37/8 38/5 44/9 add [3] 41/13 41/22 50/21 |
| | addition [3] 15/24 18/25 43/16 |
| 441 053 [1] 18/25 | additional [4] 15/5 15/6 16/1 42/1 |
| 46 [1] 18/19 | address [4] 18/18 18/20 41/16 54/24 |
| 5 | addressed [1] 24/11 |
| | adequate [2] 8/24 47/1 |
| | administrative [6] 14/21 26/25 30/20 32/21 35/8 40/9 |
| | admission [1] 31/7 |
| | admissions [1] 10/7 |
| | admit [5] 15/22 17/19 29/20 31/4 31/4 |
| | admitted [1] 32/25 |
| | advance [1] 8/21 advancing [1] 8/9 |
| | ADVOCACY [2] 1/3 4/5 |
| | advocate [2] 43/7 47/15 |
| | advocates [1] 47/21 |
| 8 | affected [2] 44/1 44/2 |
| 8188 [1] 3/5 | affecting [1] 43/22 after [5] 5/4 14/2 24/11 27/14 33/12 |
| 888 [1] 2/13 | afternoon [1] 50/20 |
| 9 | again [11] 6/21 7/6 7/18 8/10 8/24 9/3 |
| | 9/18 17/25 20/24 22/24 41/3 |
| 97201 [1] 2/20 | against [1] 47/11 ago [3] 23/11 37/15 38/24 |
| 97204 [2] 2/13 3/4 | agree [6] 5/10 29/16 29/17 39/18 53/13 |
| | 53/17 |
| 9/301 [1] 2/23 | agreed [2] 12/4 13/7 |
| A | agreement [1] 10/9 |
| ability [4] 17/24 18/9 28/7 31/10 | ahead [6] 12/22 20/22 24/13 47/25 49/4 50/19 |
| able [2] 37/11 45/7 | aid [4] 47/18 47/19 53/16 54/11 |
| | al [7] 1/3 1/6 1/8 1/11 1/13 4/6 4/6 |
| | Alder [1] 2/9 |
| 23/9 24/10 24/22 28/6 28/6 28/10 28/21 | Alex [2] 2/15 4/17 |
| 30/21 33/6 34/17 37/14 37/17 39/23 40/1 | align [1] 51/15 aligned [8] 44/5 44/24 44/24 47/2 49/1 |
| 40/4 42/15 48/14 48/20 50/7 50/7 52/17 | 52/8 52/22 52/24 |
| | alignment [2] 43/10 43/23 |
| | alignments [1] 44/5 |
| absence [1] 54/17 | all [31] 8/23 9/16 16/8 16/16 16/18 21/4 |
| absolutely [3] 10/4 13/17 16/23 | 21/7 23/19 24/14 24/16 26/6 27/2 28/4 29/23 30/22 31/18 32/19 36/9 39/14 |
| absolve [1] 22/13 | 40/17 41/11 44/22 45/23 46/2 48/6 50/1 |
| | 52/6 52/7 53/10 56/11 56/14 |
| | allegation [2] 15/14 15/16 |
| | allegations [2] 11/1 15/4 |
| accessible [1] 54/11 | allege [5] 10/5 12/25 14/17 20/14 41/5 |
| accomplish [1] 35/24 | alleged [5] 13/17 28/24 35/17 38/17 41/19 |
| accordance [1] 19/13 | 11/10 |
| | 34 [1] 42/9 3:02-cv-00339-MO [1] 1/4 3:02-cv-339-MO [1] 4/5 3:21-cv-01637-MO [1] 1/9 3:21-cv-1637-MO [1] 4/6 4 40 [1] 53/21 415 [1] 2/9 426 [1] 33/9 426.060 [1] 33/9 426.150 [1] 33/9 441.053 [1] 18/25 46 [1] 18/19 5 503 [1] 3/5 511 [1] 2/5 6 610 [1] 2/9 6:22-cv-01460-MO [1] 1/14 6:22-cv-1460-MO [1] 4/7 7 7,000 [4] 24/23 24/23 25/7 25/14 760 [1] 2/16 8 8188 [1] 3/5 888 [1] 2/13 9 900 [1] 2/13 97201 [1] 2/20 97204 [2] 2/13 3/4 97205 [3] 2/5 2/9 2/16 97301 [1] 2/23 A ability [4] 17/24 18/9 28/7 31/10 able [2] 37/11 45/7 abortion [1] 44/1 about [35] 5/4 5/19 10/17 15/16 16/19 17/14 18/1 19/23 22/10 22/10 23/5 23/7 23/9 24/10 24/22 28/6 28/6 28/10 28/21 30/21 33/6 34/17 37/14 37/17 39/23 40/1 40/4 42/15 48/14 48/20 50/7 50/7 52/17 52/18 55/11 above [1] 57/6 absence [1] 54/17 absolutely [3] 10/4 13/17 16/23 absolve [1] 22/13 absurd [1] 56/3 accept [3] 18/12 22/24 33/20 accept [3] 18/12 22/24 33/20 accept [3] 18/12 22/24 33/20 accept [1] 56/3 accept [1] 54/17 absolutely [3] 10/4 13/17 16/23 absolve [1] 56/3 accept [3] 18/12 22/24 33/20 accept [3] 18/12 22/24 33/20 accept [1] 54/17 accomplish [1] 35/24 |

ALLEN [1] 1/16

alleviating [1] 32/10 allow [5] 35/4 42/3 47/7 47/9 55/2

allowed [1] 51/2 **allows [1]** 36/1

almost [3] 5/15 8/13 48/8

alone [1] 41/18 along [1] 29/24

already [2] 42/17 54/15

also [10] 3/1 6/23 12/14 13/14 21/9 21/18 41/22 41/24 48/12 54/16

alternative [3] 27/24 31/15 51/20 always [3] 5/15 41/1 52/8

am [2] 23/5 40/3

amended [1] 15/15

Amendment [6] 7/1 39/15 39/20 39/23 39/24 41/6

amicus [1] 48/13 among [1] 54/5

amplify [1] 28/12

analysis [5] 7/13 7/14 47/13 50/10 53/1 another [7] 23/12 30/21 42/4 43/19 45/16 52/20 53/21

answer [12] 8/10 12/19 12/22 15/22 27/23 27/25 38/6 38/9 38/11 38/23 39/5 56/12

answered [1] 38/24

any [36] 6/13 6/18 6/24 8/11 8/12 12/12 14/19 15/5 22/3 22/7 25/2 26/20 28/5 28/6 28/8 28/13 29/2 31/10 31/13 35/10 37/13 38/2 40/17 41/8 41/18 41/19 41/21 43/2 44/9 45/18 47/12 51/1 53/18 54/2 54/6 55/7

anvbody [1] 55/14

anymore [5] 11/24 12/15 20/18 34/16 38/1

anyone [1] 35/7

anything [9] 14/3 15/2 19/20 28/17 31/21 32/2 35/7 38/10 41/13

anyway [1] 20/19

anywhere [3] 35/8 38/21 40/14

apologize [2] 19/5 20/24

apparently [1] 10/13 appear [1] 9/11

APPEARANCES [1] 2/2

appears [3] 6/15 6/20 6/25

applications [1] 16/6 applied [1] 15/25

applies [1] 27/21

apply [2] 27/11 32/22

appropriate [2] 14/24 46/15

April [3] 1/16 4/2 57/9

are [69]

aren't [1] 39/3

argue [2] 31/13 31/16

argued [1] 7/11

argument [16] 1/20 4/5 5/12 6/24 7/3 9/3 14/10 18/14 29/6 29/10 32/13 32/20 39/8 42/20 42/21 53/13

arguments [2] 5/4 7/25

around [1] 54/3

arrangement [17] 5/14 5/16 5/21 10/13 10/14 10/25 11/4 11/13 11/19 12/6 12/7 12/9 13/21 21/3 26/21 34/19 35/1

arrangements [1] 6/4

arrive [4] 17/15 17/16 17/17 27/2

arrived [1] 36/7

as [50] 6/20 7/4 7/11 7/23 7/24 8/7 8/25 9/7 10/15 11/14 12/2 13/1 13/1 13/4 16/22 23/1 25/4 25/6 26/24 26/24 26/24 29/15 32/7 34/12 34/12 34/14 36/2 38/16 being [10] 9/13 10/15 12/5 13/5 13/19 39/23 42/19 42/22 43/6 43/6 43/6 43/7 44/3 44/11 45/3 45/11 45/14 45/18 45/19 45/25 48/21 52/2 54/20 55/21 55/21

56/12 56/12 ask [2] 36/20 53/11

asked [4] 12/5 15/4 41/25 53/8

asking [10] 20/25 26/5 28/1 28/21 28/22 39/23 39/24 41/4 50/14 50/16

aspects [1] 42/24

asserting [3] 43/15 43/17 48/5

assign [1] 14/23

assist [4] 47/18 47/19 53/16 54/11

assume [2] 19/24 45/19

assumed [1] 15/9 attention [1] 55/15

attested [1] 54/21

attorney [2] 52/19 54/2

attorney-client [1] 52/19

attrition [1] 8/3

authority [9] 14/23 30/17 33/5 33/10 33/15 33/18 40/21 47/15 51/1

automatically [1] 10/22 availability [1] 53/12

available [3] 44/15 54/9 54/10

Ave [1] 3/4

Avenue [3] 2/5 2/13 2/16

avenues [1] 23/9

avoid [4] 23/16 32/14 38/12 38/16

aware [2] 41/3 46/16

away [6] 15/17 15/19 33/18 39/12 45/19 46/7

В

back [4] 14/13 22/24 31/25 46/1 backed [3] 6/24 41/18 41/21

bad [3] 6/5 6/7 47/10

balance [2] 51/3 51/20

bar [1] 52/11

basic [1] 21/15

Basically [1] 35/18

basis [7] 14/19 14/21 15/9 15/18 18/13 29/22 49/25

be [91]

became [1] 34/19

because [45] 5/13 6/8 7/10 7/25 8/13 8/17 9/10 12/11 14/1 17/22 20/12 20/19 22/7 23/21 26/13 27/21 28/9 28/21 29/2 32/8 33/2 34/23 35/12 35/20 37/13 38/4 38/7 38/19 44/1 44/3 44/4 44/7 44/18 44/22 45/5 46/10 46/12 47/16 48/10 48/22 49/9 52/1 52/6 53/3 53/9

become [4] 17/11 27/3 27/7 27/10 bed [1] 25/9

beds [7] 6/16 7/4 12/12 32/12 39/16 40/22 40/23

been [24] 6/4 6/5 6/24 7/11 10/3 10/8 13/19 17/14 18/21 31/9 32/24 33/11 37/17 42/18 43/14 51/5 53/10 53/20

53/21 53/24 54/21 54/22 55/3 55/13 before [7] 1/22 11/2 18/17 28/1 29/19 36/16 53/7

behalf [10] 4/11 5/8 7/15 7/18 7/20 8/6 8/20 39/7 42/16 43/17

behavioral [4] 10/3 19/11 24/7 48/22 27/16 37/4 47/5 47/21 53/6

beings [1] 43/20

believe [7] 12/1 16/5 29/17 41/10 46/16 48/6 50/15

below [1] 57/4

benefit [3] 28/9 45/8 51/12 benefiting [2] 18/24 27/16

besides [1] 27/25 best [1] 45/24

better [1] 37/22

between [11] 12/3 35/24 40/25 41/1 43/11 43/20 48/10 51/1 51/9 52/16 52/24

big [1] 22/18 **Bisgaard [1]** 2/12

bit [2] 18/1 53/6

bless [1] 38/14 blind [1] 4/24

BOBBY [1] 1/6

Bonita [3] 3/3 57/9 57/10

books [1] 20/12

both [8] 9/17 17/5 21/10 23/9 40/4 41/5 45/10 53/21

bound [1] 42/25 bow [1] 20/23

bowed [1] 37/25

BOWMAN [2] 1/8 47/17

box [1] 13/16 **boxes [1]** 13/13

break [1] 5/4 brief [6] 35/13 41/7 41/16 42/7 48/13 48/24

briefed [6] 29/5 30/10 39/13 41/15

48/12 56/8 briefing [4] 45/1 45/2 52/23 54/21

bring [5] 7/20 8/5 8/16 42/15 55/20 bringing [2] 8/12 8/19

Brisbois [1] 2/12 brought [4] 9/25 24/20 46/12 55/14

buck [1] 20/14 **build [1]** 50/2

built [1] 50/13 burden [2] 45/3 45/17

business [4] 5/25 11/14 23/23 35/15

California [2] 5/22 48/7 call [3] 5/8 5/22 20/3 called [1] 25/1

came [1] 34/23

44/9 44/10 49/24

can [30] 5/3 5/23 9/20 9/24 13/8 13/12 13/13 16/19 20/17 23/16 24/5 24/11 24/15 28/23 28/24 32/23 33/2 33/18 35/15 36/11 36/14 43/18 43/19 44/18 44/19 45/12 47/3 47/4 49/14 49/24 can't [21] 5/16 5/23 6/17 7/9 15/17 16/19 16/19 19/19 19/19 19/20 19/21 20/9 21/17 21/24 22/6 22/8 28/8 34/14

cannot [18] 10/18 10/23 12/11 14/2 15/19 16/23 16/25 19/12 19/16 22/2 23/12 25/5 25/16 28/23 34/4 47/6 47/9

capable [1] 32/2 capacity [2] 37/13 48/21

care [67] cared [1] 34/24 careful [1] 33/7 cares [1] 46/23 Carla [2] 2/18 4/15

C

case [32] 1/4 1/9 1/14 4/5 4/6 5/15 5/23 6/3 7/11 8/14 10/24 18/11 23/23 28/9 37/14 37/25 42/19 43/13 43/24 44/25 47/17 48/6 48/11 49/9 49/9 52/11 55/6 55/11 55/13 55/20 56/4 56/10

cases [9] 5/17 7/23 10/5 40/25 41/9 42/8 43/15 48/2 54/25

category [1] 31/13 cause [1] 57/6

cease [5] 10/14 22/16 29/11 44/22 49/12

ceased [1] 37/4 **CENTER [2]** 1/3 4/5 centers [2] 32/7 54/15 Central [1] 42/12

certain [4] 24/4 35/5 36/1 44/4

certainly [3] 47/14 53/1 53/2 certificates [1] 13/8

certification [16] 11/16 16/1 23/1 26/21 29/2 29/14 30/14 30/24 34/20 35/1 35/12 35/23 36/7 36/17 36/24 37/1

certifications [5] 15/24 16/7 35/4 35/9

certified [9] 32/24 37/7 37/16 37/18 37/20 38/1 38/3 39/1 57/7

certify [1] 57/4 challenge [1] 48/21

challenges [3] 53/19 53/20 54/3 change [4] 6/1 23/16 29/15 34/21

changes [3] 10/3 10/6 15/13

changing [1] 10/9 **Chapter [1]** 33/8 **check [2]** 13/12 13/13

checked [3] 13/10 13/14 13/16

checkmarks [1] 13/10 **child [1]** 52/16

choice [1] 31/2

choose [2] 33/2 47/16

choosing [1] 31/22 chose [1] 34/20

chosen [2] 45/18 47/18

chronologically [1] 5/5 Circuit [2] 55/1 56/4

Circuit's [1] 18/13

cite [4] 14/19 15/21 31/18 41/8

cited [2] 35/7 54/25

cites [1] 48/2 civil [15] 25/9 25/14 25/17 25/24 26/7 26/9 28/1 32/22 33/1 33/16 34/2 34/4

34/13 40/19 54/9 civilly [32] 6/17 14/18 14/20 14/23 15/23 17/9 17/11 17/12 20/16 22/14 27/7 27/10 27/14 29/21 29/21 30/1 30/6 30/7

claim [27] 6/11 6/11 6/24 7/1 7/2 7/2 7/13 7/20 8/6 8/12 8/24 9/4 9/9 39/8 39/10 39/12 39/15 39/23 39/25 40/7 40/14 40/18 40/19 40/24 41/23 42/5 42/15

claims [14] 5/5 5/8 6/9 7/15 7/17 8/9 8/19 8/21 9/4 9/17 9/17 39/7 43/15 43/17

clarification [2] 9/15 54/14

clarify [1] 49/5 Class [1] 13/15

classifications [1] 14/6

clear [5] 11/3 34/18 41/2 55/6 56/4 clearly [4] 52/2 52/8 52/16 52/21 client [5] 23/4 30/4 34/20 52/19 53/19 clients [12] 35/9 36/3 37/3 38/4 38/7 38/14 45/3 45/19 46/2 46/11 50/3 51/12

clients' [3] 46/3 46/6 46/22

close [12] 7/22 10/13 42/18 42/22 42/22 43/2 43/14 43/18 44/6 48/3 48/9 53/3

closer [1] 30/9 coalition [1] 8/18 colleague's [1] 28/11

come [7] 14/13 16/24 17/1 23/7 24/16 30/9 31/11

comes [4] 7/6 18/12 44/13 44/23 commandeering [1] 40/21 commit [1] 50/6

commitment [16] 25/10 25/14 25/17 25/25 26/7 26/9 28/2 32/22 33/2 33/13 33/16 33/19 34/2 34/13 40/20 54/10

commitments [1] 54/11

committed [31] 6/17 14/18 14/20 14/23 15/23 17/9 17/11 17/12 22/14 27/8 27/10 27/14 29/21 29/21 30/2 30/6 30/8 30/11 30/23 32/24 33/11 33/13 33/19 34/16 35/5 45/12 47/20 47/22 48/20 53/14 55/17

common [1] 53/18

community [9] 17/3 24/19 32/5 32/23 34/1 35/3 40/21 49/14 55/20

compensation [2] 41/25 42/4

complain [1] 22/21 complaining [1] 55/5

complaint [32] 5/17 6/4 6/7 10/5 11/1 12/25 13/18 15/2 15/15 15/17 18/19 23/4 Court's [1] 55/15 25/13 25/20 25/25 26/10 26/17 27/4 27/11 27/11 27/13 27/20 27/22 28/2 28/3 28/24 31/25 35/17 38/17 40/11 40/14

48/24

completely [1] 32/3 complex [1] 40/20 complicated [1] 27/23 component [2] 6/23 23/15 concept [1] 53/24

concern [1] 9/8

concerned [2] 19/2 51/17 concerns [1] 32/10 concluded [1] 56/15

condition [2] 25/2 25/2 conditions [1] 33/3

conduct [4] 41/20 41/20 43/21 44/23

confidential [1] 43/13

conflict [4] 45/11 50/23 51/22 54/1

consensual [1] 15/24 consent [3] 14/25 15/22 30/19

considered [1] 54/23 considers [1] 19/14

consistent [1] 13/18 Constitution [1] 7/13

constitutionally [3] 44/21 46/14 47/1 contend [3] 23/21 31/24 49/24

contending [2] 32/3 47/4

continue [6] 10/20 13/15 18/23 31/15 31/23 33/21

continued [3] 20/10 32/15 35/1

contract [1] 11/8 contractual [1] 11/11 contrary [1] 14/22 convinced [1] 38/9

core [4] 14/10 25/13 25/20 29/5

corporation [2] 52/4 53/4 **corporations [2]** 51/2 51/25 corporations' [1] 52/24

correct [18] 11/6 11/21 12/1 14/12 20/13 21/23 25/22 27/5 29/4 30/5 30/8 30/14 32/18 34/10 39/10 39/11 55/12

correctly [1] 25/23 correlation [1] 7/23

correspondence [3] 8/5 42/19 43/10

cost [1] 8/2 **costing [1]** 37/10

could [26] 8/5 8/16 10/14 10/14 10/24 11/23 12/14 12/20 15/8 22/16 22/19 29/1 29/7 29/11 32/14 36/15 36/19 36/20 38/2 38/11 38/18 39/22 48/19 48/23 50/7 51/8

couldn't [2] 38/15 52/13

counsel [9] 4/8 9/18 15/7 15/19 18/18

29/24 31/18 48/2 48/17 country [1] 4/24

county [2] 14/22 30/17 couple [2] 16/16 48/1

course [4] 5/14 21/24 22/2 37/9

court [23] 1/1 1/23 2/22 3/3 18/13 18/13 28/5 28/13 28/18 36/20 40/1 48/9 52/9 52/9 52/13 52/20 53/7 53/11 55/18 55/21

55/22 56/14 57/11

Courthouse [1] 3/3 covered [1] 25/3

Craig [2] 2/21 4/13 create [2] 49/22 54/1

created [1] 19/13 creates [1] 45/5

criminal [1] 8/14 crisis [1] 10/4

criteria [5] 26/3 33/14 34/2 34/4 34/13

CRR [2] 3/3 57/10 CSR [2] 3/3 57/10 cure [1] 44/14

current [2] 46/8 48/18 currently [1] 50/23

custody [3] 33/5 33/10 47/7 **customers** [1] 43/17

cv [6] 1/4 1/9 1/14 4/5 4/6 4/7

39/11

Ε

during [2] 6/1 6/6

duties [1] 47/8

earlier [1] 16/18

37/11

difficult [1] 53/14

directed [1] 27/13

directer [1] 32/22

directives [1] 21/20

directly [2] 22/8 23/8

disability [4] 2/3 2/4 4/9 9/11

everybody [1] 44/19

exactly [2] 49/7 54/3

excellent [1] 51/11

example [2] 5/20 43/25

exact [1] 56/10

exam [1] 25/1

everyone [3] 18/8 18/9 18/12

(4) danger - excellent

five [3] 11/17 12/8 13/13 five-day [3] 11/17 12/8 13/13 fixed [1] 47/3 flow [1] 28/3 focused [1] 52/10 folks [2] 8/14 10/15 follow [5] 5/5 21/17 21/18 24/12 27/18 follow-up [1] 27/18 forced [3] 13/5 14/20 15/3 forcing [3] 14/17 18/14 31/4

foreclosed [1] 44/4

foregoing [1] 57/4

form [2] 26/16 27/4

had [1] 43/25 hadn't [1] 36/7 halcyon [1] 46/16 Hampshire [1] 18/11

homeless [2] 51/7 51/10 guess [6] 20/17 23/3 23/10 27/18 29/13 Honor [18] 4/9 4/20 9/25 14/9 19/5 38/18 41/10 41/14 42/8 42/21 48/21 49/3 50/16 50/20 50/22 51/23 53/17 54/19 **HONORABLE [1]** 1/22 Horst [1] 2/8

Н

40/6

hospital [53] 6/16 10/7 10/8 11/5 15/11

17/17 24/18 24/22 24/25 25/11 25/15

27/16 28/8 29/15 29/20 30/19 30/19

Н

hospital... [36] 30/23 31/11 31/22 32/1 32/24 32/25 33/15 34/1 34/1 34/13 35/4 35/21 36/4 36/6 36/12 36/14 36/15 36/19 36/25 37/3 37/6 37/12 37/16 37/18 37/21 37/23 38/3 39/1 40/21 44/16 47/10 48/7 48/11 49/9 51/2 51/25

hospital's [4] 28/6 31/2 31/10 51/13 hospitals [32] 5/13 15/3 15/4 18/11 18/15 19/12 19/17 19/18 24/17 24/19 26/14 26/24 29/18 32/3 33/4 35/25 36/13 36/23 37/19 39/3 43/6 44/8 45/10 45/11 45/19 48/4 48/24 49/1 49/15 51/4 55/20 56/3

Hotel [1] 5/22 hours [1] 26/6 house [2] 18/23 31/15 how [8] 8/16 16/19 23/7 35/14 48/19 52/23 54/3 54/4 human [1] 43/20 hurt [1] 47/10 hypothetical [1] 20/6

ı

I'd [3] 16/17 16/18 19/4

I'II [9] 5/4 5/8 5/22 6/9 12/3 14/13 19/2 41/11 56/11

I'm [29] 5/4 5/20 7/12 16/5 19/2 20/13 20/25 22/15 22/17 22/18 24/10 26/5 28/21 28/22 33/4 34/18 38/7 38/8 38/25 39/23 39/24 41/3 41/3 46/16 49/17 50/5 51/5 51/17 53/6

I've [2] 4/23 28/11

idea [4] 30/10 33/12 48/14 56/8

identical [2] 9/13 48/8

identify [1] 41/18

illness [5] 8/9 8/13 25/9 26/4 26/25

Imagine [1] 49/17 immediately [1] 51/7 impact [2] 41/19 55/14 imperfect [1] 6/18

important [4] 5/12 10/16 47/4 50/10

importantly [1] 11/16 impossible [1] 30/25 impression [1] 29/13 inability [1] 44/12 include [1] 55/19 includes [2] 22/11 49/13 including [3] 21/19 25/2

including [3] 21/19 25/2 44/16

incorrect [1] 32/25 incumbent [2] 56/2 56/5 indicated [1] 51/25 indicia [1] 16/2 indigent [1] 8/11

individual [6] 19/14 32/23 34/12 34/14 51/15 53/19

individually [1] 6/10 individuals [2] 54/5 55/17 inextricably [1] 42/25 initial [1] 36/14 initially [1] 11/4 initiating [1] 25/9

injunction [6] 42/1 42/3 48/25 49/6 49/11 49/22

injunctive [1] 54/4

injury [1] 7/19 inpatient [2] 16/22 23/8

insofar [1] 45/11 instance [3] 17/17 43/24 44/25 interconnected [1] 55/15

interest [9] 42/19 43/23 45/5 51/14 51/15 51/16 51/23 54/1 56/5

interests [17] 7/24 7/24 8/5 8/18 43/10 43/10 44/5 44/23 46/3 46/6 47/2 47/11 49/1 52/8 52/10 52/22 52/24

interfered [1] 41/20

interim [4] 13/23 50/3 50/11 50/12 intervene [1] 55/7

intervening [1] 55/22

INTERVENORS [1] 2/11

intervention [3] 9/16 54/15 54/23 investment [2] 41/18 41/21

investment-backed [2] 41/18 41/21

invitation [1] 56/2 involuntarily [2] 25/15 31/16

involuntary [3] 20/11 20/22 23/2 involve [1] 31/19

involved [1] 11/4 involving [1] 43/15

iron [1] 16/15 is [197]

is identical [1] 9/13

isn't [15] 9/22 12/15 17/21 23/5 28/22 30/24 37/13 37/16 37/18 37/25 38/21 39/10 39/11 45/18 48/22

issue [15] 5/9 7/5 7/10 7/18 8/22 17/20 24/11 31/20 39/18 41/23 42/16 42/16 42/17 54/20 54/24

issued [1] 55/21

issues [4] 18/20 31/19 41/12 47/3 it [107]

it's [51] 5/11 5/12 5/15 5/20 7/23 10/16 11/10 11/22 12/6 12/20 13/3 17/22 18/7 18/19 19/25 20/5 20/6 20/25 21/4 21/8 21/9 21/10 22/7 22/13 23/8 25/12 25/16 26/9 28/2 31/16 32/6 32/8 32/17 33/14 42/9 44/7 45/23 46/5 46/9 46/17 46/20 46/21 47/2 47/5 48/8 50/10 50/25 52/21 53/1 54/22 56/4

its [8] 8/12 22/13 30/16 33/19 49/12 52/3 53/8 55/18

IJ

JAROD [1] 1/8
Jesse [2] 2/8 4/11
job [1] 28/14
Johnson [4] 2/21 4/13 16/12 16/14
JUDGE [3] 1/23 24/10 32/20
judicial [1] 13/9
juncture [1] 49/1
jurisprudence [1] 52/9
just [44] 4/22 4/22 9/20 9/20 10/3 11/18
12/14 12/20 15/7 16/18 17/2 18/16 18/17
18/18 20/19 21/16 22/12 22/15 22/18
23/3 25/10 29/7 29/24 34/18 35/15 36/22
37/15 37/17 38/11 38/12 39/24 40/10
41/25 46/1 46/5 46/9 46/20 47/2 48/1

52/3 52/3 52/18 54/19 56/3

Justice [4] 2/19 2/22 4/14 4/16

Κ

keep [12] 20/18 20/19 21/1 21/6 21/7 21/9 22/20 25/21 26/11 31/17 50/12 50/15

kept [1] 25/15

kind [12] 10/21 11/17 12/4 12/4 13/1 13/5 18/10 23/22 24/4 25/2 31/13 55/2

kinds [3] 10/17 10/25 19/22

know [29] 5/20 5/21 7/4 7/5 8/16 13/11 20/5 22/9 24/3 27/7 38/13 39/4 40/10 44/19 49/20 50/4 50/6 51/5 51/9 51/10 51/11 51/14 53/19 53/20 54/3 54/20 54/25 55/3 55/5

knows [1] 48/21

1

labels [1] 40/13 lack [2] 6/18 8/17 lacks [1] 6/13

laid [4] 20/10 21/24 22/2 22/6

language [1] 9/7

last [5] 31/8 53/10 55/7 55/16 55/18

later [1] 27/3

latter [3] 10/23 13/6 13/20

law [27] 14/3 14/19 18/11 21/22 22/9 22/11 22/11 22/13 24/20 25/3 25/6 29/17 31/3 31/5 31/6 32/4 33/7 33/25 34/11 42/3 42/19 43/13 44/25 47/6 52/15 56/4 56/10

laws [6] 19/1 20/9 25/15 31/14 31/18 34/25

lawsuit [8] 8/16 45/9 45/14 45/15 45/25 46/12 46/22 47/18

leads [1] 28/3

least [5] 25/24 26/6 28/20 30/25 32/4

leave [2] 10/14 34/3 LEGACY [2] 1/13 52/7

legal [3] 32/9 33/20 47/8

legally [1] 28/7

legislative [3] 21/1 21/6 21/8

legislature [1] 20/12 let [2] 20/22 41/18

let's [9] 8/14 9/16 9/18 11/18 19/24 39/6 40/13 42/15 46/18

level [2] 13/23 36/14

Levi [1] 2/8

Lewis [1] 2/12

liberty [1] 37/5 licensed [1] 26/23

lifetime [1] 46/19

like [23] 5/16 6/3 6/3 6/5 6/7 7/2 7/9 8/4 8/20 16/15 16/17 16/18 18/10 19/4 19/25 33/3 35/14 37/5 38/7 43/16 45/25 50/9 51/10

likely [1] 50/25 limbo [1] 19/19

limited [3] 21/19 50/24 50/25

limiting [1] 9/10 line [1] 40/25

literal [1] 43/20

literally [2] 22/4 22/6

litigant [2] 43/1 43/6 litigate [2] 17/4 50/7

litigated [1] 7/23 litigating [1] 9/1

litigation [5] 46/2 46/6 47/17 48/15 49/21 little [1] 18/1

live [1] 53/9

LLP [3] 2/8 2/12 2/15

long [25] 6/16 10/8 10/18 13/2 13/6 13/15 14/19 14/21 15/9 19/21 20/1 20/2 20/15 29/22 31/7 31/12 31/20 34/12 35/10 37/2 44/8 44/11 44/15 44/16 49/13

long-term [22] 6/16 10/8 10/18 13/2 13/6 13/15 14/19 14/21 15/9 19/21 20/2 20/15 29/22 31/7 31/12 31/20 35/10 44/8 misunderstanding [1] 20/14 44/11 44/15 44/16 49/13

longer [8] 18/23 25/10 27/15 34/19 35/16 36/18 45/18 53/24

look [8] 6/9 7/17 7/21 8/7 9/24 10/2 13/10 15/21

looking [5] 10/1 22/15 22/17 22/18 49/7 looks [5] 6/3 6/5 6/7 7/2 7/9 lose [3] 39/21 39/22 45/13 lot [4] 7/2 8/2 50/5 54/15 love [1] 40/13

made [4] 7/25 9/12 10/10 18/18

maintain [1] 38/1 **major [1]** 5/9

make [5] 12/2 20/21 20/23 21/1 30/18 makes [1] 18/10

making [6] 8/15 20/10 21/6 21/6 21/9

26/11 many [3] 9/6 23/7 26/13

Market [1] 2/20 materially [1] 10/22

matter [6] 8/25 21/5 23/11 23/14 27/20 46/5

matters [2] 45/5 45/8 **MATTEUCCI [1]** 1/11

may [4] 9/1 27/21 27/21 29/21

maybe [2] 5/18 8/11

me [23] 4/22 4/22 5/12 6/15 8/18 9/5 12/20 20/13 22/22 23/3 26/5 26/10 33/18 33/20 36/17 36/22 37/15 38/11 38/13 38/25 39/15 46/16 49/16

mean [6] 17/2 17/3 24/2 38/6 45/2 56/1

means [3] 15/8 34/4 43/9 mechanism [1] 54/3

Medicaid [2] 43/25 43/25

medical [8] 14/5 15/20 25/1 28/23 31/19 47/7 47/8 47/11

medically [4] 14/2 18/23 19/21 19/22

Medicare [1] 33/4

Medicare-participating [1] 33/4

meet [3] 25/18 26/3 43/8 meeting [2] 34/3 54/17

meets [3] 33/13 34/2 34/13

Member [1] 4/6

mental [10] 8/9 14/22 25/9 25/11 26/3 26/25 30/17 32/23 35/22 55/15

mentioned [2] 21/21 29/24

merely [1] 6/17 merits [2] 24/11 39/24

Merrithew [3] 2/8 2/8 4/11

met [3] 43/3 43/8 47/5

metaphor [1] 22/7

METROPOLITAN [2] 2/7 4/12

MICHAEL [1] 1/22

might [8] 5/2 6/2 7/8 8/12 18/16 29/14 38/9 38/9

minimize [1] 38/6

MINK [4] 1/6 4/6 47/17 55/11

Mink-Bowman [1] 47/17 minute [4] 4/22 23/11 37/15 38/24

misinterpretation [1] 32/21 missed [1] 40/6

mission [2] 8/19 11/24

mix [3] 8/10 8/17 23/9

MO [6] 1/4 1/9 1/14 4/5 4/6 4/7

moment [1] 4/22 monetary [1] 54/4

money [3] 8/2 37/10 42/1

month [1] 55/22

more [11] 18/1 20/17 24/23 25/7 28/6 28/8 33/6 39/8 46/14 52/15 53/18

morphed [3] 12/10 12/24 13/3

morphs [1] 12/13

MOSMAN [3] 1/22 24/10 32/20

most [1] 5/12

mostly [1] 43/22

motion [8] 5/7 5/9 9/15 9/17 13/9 41/8 48/12 54/14

move [6] 11/2 25/17 36/16 39/6 44/10 51/7

moving [1] 51/5

MPD [3] 53/10 54/6 56/2

Mr [6] 2/4 2/8 2/12 2/15 2/21 16/14

Mr. [1] 16/12

Mr. Johnson [1] 16/12

Ms [1] 2/18

Ms. [2] 14/16 28/16 Ms. Scott [2] 14/16 28/16

much [15] 7/14 16/8 28/4 28/22 29/15

32/19 34/21 37/10 42/6 47/23 49/2 50/21 52/23 54/13 56/11

multiple [4] 28/25 43/8 45/24 54/25 must [1] 14/24

my [14] 4/24 4/24 8/25 11/22 16/18 21/4 26/19 29/13 32/6 35/11 35/11 38/24 50/10 56/11

Ν

nail [1] 50/22 name [1] 4/8

nature [5] 12/17 16/21 43/13 51/22 53/2

NE [1] 2/22

nearly [1] 43/6 necessarily [2] 32/9 51/6

necessary [1] 16/13

need [15] 4/24 14/5 15/20 19/15 19/22 20/18 20/20 21/12 30/11 37/23 38/8 39/8 44/9 45/16 51/22

needed [2] 18/5 36/6

needs [4] 19/14 21/13 21/15 49/25

Neiman [2] 2/12 4/19

never [3] 13/21 33/18 34/8 Nevertheless [1] 38/11

new [3] 18/11 50/2 50/13 Newdow [1] 52/13

Ninth [3] 2/16 55/1 56/4 no [38] 1/4 1/9 1/14 4/5 7/7 7/8 9/3 10/11 12/19 15/4 18/21 18/23 20/20 22/4 25/10 26/13 27/15 28/15 31/3 31/14 32/9 32/15 33/7 34/19 35/11 35/16 35/18 36/18 37/13 40/16 42/11 42/13 47/8 48/18 52/15 53/3 53/7 55/19

none [1] 13/16 nonreviewable [1] 9/7 nontherapeutic [1] 51/10 Nos [1] 4/6

not [106] note [3] 16/11 16/19 19/3

nothing [5] 14/1 15/12 18/14 31/22 35/6 notice [4] 13/9 25/9 26/3 26/25

notion [2] 53/7 56/1

now [21] 7/17 10/2 10/11 10/21 11/7 12/5 13/4 13/14 13/19 15/7 23/20 31/16 34/15 43/4 43/17 45/25 48/21 48/23 49/23 49/23 55/10

nowhere [2] 14/1 19/17

number [4] 5/5 7/18 29/25 30/1

numbers [1] 23/7 numerous [2] 5/17 43/15

O

o0o [1] 57/2

OAR [3] 14/25 15/22 19/1

obligate [1] 35/9

obligated [3] 5/25 21/17 29/12

obligation [2] 22/14 33/20

obtained [1] 15/25

obvious [1] 50/23 **Obviously [1]** 8/10

occurs [1] 16/4

off [2] 44/4 46/1

offerings [1] 53/8 Official [1] 57/11

officials [1] 24/21

OHA [47] 9/5 13/20 13/24 14/17 15/4 15/5 17/6 18/19 18/21 18/25 19/25 20/3 20/5 20/7 20/10 20/11 20/15 20/18 21/3 21/5 21/10 21/17 22/13 24/17 26/21 29/2 29/14 30/6 30/7 30/7 30/14 30/16 34/21 44/7 44/23 45/18 45/21 46/10 48/25 49/12 49/13 49/22 50/1 51/6 51/6 53/8

56/2 OHA's [4] 20/21 20/22 21/10 21/19

Okay [1] 12/23

once [5] 24/24 28/7 30/6 30/7 55/23 one [25] 6/8 7/18 10/4 12/11 13/1 13/19 21/21 23/11 24/6 29/1 29/6 29/23 32/15 32/16 36/2 39/9 42/16 42/24 43/11 43/18 46/21 49/17 53/3 53/7 53/19

one-page [1] 49/17 ongoing [2] 45/6 54/22

only [13] 4/23 6/22 7/12 26/19 30/12 31/5 31/6 32/22 41/3 44/13 44/18 44/19

operation [3] 20/8 22/9 40/19 opinion [1] 42/23 opponent [1] 41/12 opponent's [1] 35/13 opportunity [2] 26/14 55/6

oppose [1] 56/7

p.m [2] 4/2 56/15 page [1] 49/17 pages [1] 42/9 paid [1] 44/2 **PAIMI [1]** 47/15 paragraph [2] 18/19 40/17 parent [1] 52/16 pari [1] 48/15 part [7] 13/21 25/5 28/2 28/3 35/21 42/10 53/1 participate [1] 56/3 participating [1] 33/4 participation [3] 23/2 33/3 40/2

plan [1] 19/13 play [3] 21/19 44/13 47/12 pleaded [1] 18/19 pleading [1] 8/25 please [3] 4/8 20/13 22/1 pled [2] 7/11 41/4 point [21] 10/10 10/12 14/2 16/20 17/11 25/8 25/13 25/16 26/15 26/18 27/15 28/8 24/5 52/4 52/5 29/23 29/24 31/3 32/14 41/16 45/20 50/6 provision [2] 23/15 43/25

36/14 37/7 44/9 47/8 49/13 provided [7] 13/9 14/5 19/16 20/16 28/23 36/2 44/11 Providence [1] 52/7 provider [2] 43/12 53/4 providers [2] 14/22 30/17 providing [7] 10/20 11/23 16/25 23/2 (8) opposed - provision P
provisions [3] 21/19 22/12 33/8
proximity [1] 52/11
psychiatric [1] 25/2
psychiatrically [2] 24/20 25/4
public [6] 2/7 4/12 6/14 6/19 6/21 24/21
punt [1] 38/15
punting [1] 38/13
purposes [2] 5/17 7/8
pursuant [1] 25/14
pursue [1] 43/1
pursuing [1] 56/6
put [3] 8/14 9/20 32/14

\cap

quality [2] 51/4 51/8 question [23] 5/18 5/18 6/8 8/24 9/20 11/7 13/2 20/14 21/4 22/17 26/19 27/18 27/24 28/22 35/11 35/11 36/21 38/24 39/19 46/21 50/9 50/10 54/16 questions [7] 14/9 28/6 28/6 28/13 28/18 49/20 51/24 questions about [1] 28/6 quickly [2] 51/14 51/21 quit [7] 11/23 12/15 12/20 15/8 16/19 16/24 22/19 quite [2] 7/25 29/11 quote [1] 4/23

R

radiates [1] 52/23 rather [2] 8/20 30/12 reach [2] 10/12 24/24 reached [2] 27/15 28/7 read [2] 9/6 16/11 reading [1] 4/24 real [2] 5/18 5/20 realities [1] 50/24 realize [1] 20/9 really [14] 10/12 10/13 12/18 19/20 19/25 23/11 25/24 26/20 27/11 28/22 46/5 51/8 51/11 52/22 realm [1] 53/8 reason [4] 12/12 13/25 31/9 42/5 reasons [2] 8/11 12/10 rebutted [1] 56/9 receive [9] 10/15 11/9 15/12 17/6 29/12 36/18 44/19 44/20 45/7 receiving [6] 11/4 14/24 19/11 37/5 44/4 50/12 recess [2] 56/13 56/14 recited [1] 33/17 recognize [1] 21/4 recognizing [1] 25/8 reconsidered [1] 10/10 record [3] 4/8 16/6 57/5 reflects [1] 32/20 refuse [1] 13/24 refused [1] 15/12 regard [1] 5/9 regarding [1] 18/22 regardless [2] 17/24 18/9 regime [1] 18/8 regulated [1] 36/1 **regulation [1]** 18/25

regulations [5] 19/8 19/10 21/10 21/20 40/20 regulatory [16] 7/11 18/8 22/12 39/17

40/5 40/6 40/15 40/18 41/1 41/6 41/7 41/8 41/15 41/17 42/8 46/8 rejected [1] 52/21

rejection [1] 18/14 relate [1] 35/10 related [1] 6/12 relates [1] 6/12

relates [1] 6/12 relation [4] 6/13 6/19 6/21 42/18 relationship [50] 5/25 7/22 9/22 9/23 9/24 11/9 11/11 26/20 29/2 29/6 29/12 29/14 30/14 30/24 31/23 34/21 35/12 35/15 35/24 36/5 36/8 36/17 36/24 37/1 37/4 42/22 42/22 42/24 43/2 43/11 43/12 43/14 43/18 43/20 44/6 48/3 48/5 48/9 52/1 52/2 52/12 52/15 52/16 52/18 52/19 52/20 52/20 52/23 53/2 53/3

relationships [1] 48/3 relative [1] 52/10 release [1] 17/14 released [1] 25/16

relief [7] 41/24 45/8 49/19 50/2 53/11 53/15 54/4

remarkable [3] 45/22 45/23 55/10 remedy [1] 42/4

removed [2] 43/25 48/10 repeat [2] 22/1 36/20

reply [4] 16/9 48/12 49/3 55/25 **REPORTER [2]** 3/3 57/11

represent [5] 24/17 47/16 47/18 52/14 54/2

representation [1] 55/16 representative [1] 54/7 request [1] 15/5

require [9] 15/22 18/22 19/1 24/6 29/20 31/7 31/14 33/9 35/1

required [3] 13/20 14/20 38/10 requirement [2] 17/19 32/10

requires [7] 18/8 18/11 29/18 31/6 33/7 34/11 39/15

requiring [2] 14/18 49/13

residential [3] 13/14 44/17 51/11

resolve [1] 55/5

resources [7] 10/7 49/22 50/24 50/25 53/12 54/8 54/8

respect [2] 41/15 41/22 respond [1] 16/17

response [2] 14/16 41/8 responses [1] 48/1

responsibility [3] 25/12 25/17 31/17

responsible [1] 30/7

restrictive [1] 53/9 result [5] 8/2 13/4 44/12 45/9 45/14

results [1] 18/21

retreated [2] 36/17 37/4 reupped [1] 6/5

revise [1] 16/18

rid [1] 51/7

right [52] 8/18 11/9 12/6 14/11 16/8 16/16 18/3 20/7 21/22 21/25 22/3 23/19 23/22 23/25 26/12 26/17 26/18 26/22 27/4 27/8 27/9 27/12 27/13 27/22 28/4 29/3 29/8 29/9 29/23 30/2 30/15 31/1

32/6 32/8 32/19 34/12 39/12 39/14 39/23 40/17 40/23 40/24 40/25 41/11 42/25 45/2 45/20 45/24 46/2 46/21 48/20 48/23 rights [6] 2/3 2/4 4/10 43/7 47/5 48/5 rise [1] 56/14 rises [1] 41/23 risk [1] 28/20 Rives [2] 2/15 4/18 RMR [2] 3/3 57/10 room [2] 3/4 23/17 roundly [1] 54/21 rules [5] 14/21 27/1 30/20 32/21 35/8 runs [1] 9/16

S

safety [1] 6/14 said [9] 12/4 15/7 18/20 25/6 37/25 38/24 40/24 51/6 52/13 Salem [1] 2/23 same [10] 16/21 21/5 21/7 24/3 39/19 42/16 43/22 44/23 44/24 48/16 satisfied [4] 46/2 46/3 46/6 46/22 say [21] 8/17 12/11 12/14 12/23 15/19 17/1 19/6 19/9 19/10 20/2 20/3 21/16 24/2 32/25 33/7 46/18 47/2 47/5 53/1

S.W [6] 2/5 2/9 2/13 2/16 2/20 3/4

Rysselberghe [2] 2/15 4/17

saying [6] 22/21 22/23 23/10 46/5 48/17 51/5

says [12] 6/7 15/11 20/5 20/7 20/18 26/10 32/1 35/8 40/14 45/15 46/18 53/23

scenario [1] 51/18

54/19 54/25

Scott [4] 2/18 4/15 14/16 28/16

screen [2] 19/3 29/18 screening [1] 25/1 se [3] 52/1 52/21 53/3

seated [1] 24/15 second [3] 29/23 4

second [3] 29/23 42/17 43/4 secure [2] 13/14 44/17

see [4] 13/8 15/2 40/11 48/19

seek [2] 47/19 54/23

seeking [12] 17/4 41/24 41/25 42/1 45/9 49/6 49/10 49/11 49/21 50/3 50/11 53/15

seem [1] 9/5 seems [1] 4/23 seen [1] 15/14 self [1] 25/4

send [8] 30/12 36/19 37/6 37/11 37/21 38/3 38/21 56/2

sends [1] 19/25 SENIOR [1] 1/23

sent [6] 9/13 20/4 37/17 47/9 50/14 50/17

separate [4] 15/23 17/20 20/11 34/25 September [2] 55/16 55/18 service [3] 4/24 36/14 49/14

services [15] 16/25 18/24 35/5 36/1 36/6 37/8 44/1 44/2 45/8 46/14 48/8 49/13 51/9 51/11 52/5

set [5] 9/13 26/25 27/21 40/20 53/22 setting [2] 7/6 29/18

settings [4] 8/1 9/6 51/10 53/9 settlement [3] 51/1 55/2 55/4 several [1] 21/18

struck [1] 55/3

stuck [1] 19/18

struggle [1] 38/23

students [1] 43/17

sorts [1] 27/2

sound [1] 8/4

sought [2] 11/15 53/6

space [2] 14/25 47/6

33/25 46/11 52/15 53/19

Thank [24] 4/21 14/7 14/8 14/13 14/15

16/8 16/10 27/17 28/4 28/15 32/19 39/5

41/11 42/6 42/14 47/23 47/24 49/2 49/4

therefore [1] 29/8 these [46] 6/3 8/1 8/13 8/21 10/15 10/25 14/1 14/6 15/3 15/6 15/9 15/12 17/3 18/20 20/8 20/16 20/18 21/9 23/12 24/1 24/14 24/16 24/19 26/12 31/17 31/24 32/4 32/12 32/15 33/21 36/18 38/2 41/12 45/7 45/16 45/17 46/7 46/19 46/23 46/25 47/3 48/23 49/13 49/22 50/12 50/16 they [88]

they'll [2] 54/10 54/11 they're [16] 8/15 21/14 26/11 26/11 27/15 30/6 30/10 34/6 40/23 41/24 41/24 42/1 44/20 48/5 49/22 51/17 they've [3] 28/7 31/9 51/4 thing [3] 16/22 32/8 32/15 things [3] 6/1 6/7 54/15

think [36] 5/19 9/25 10/1 10/5 10/16 12/23 13/8 15/7 15/8 15/10 16/6 18/16 20/3 21/11 22/4 23/15 28/21 30/15 30/21 31/20 38/18 39/8 40/2 41/5 41/24 42/4 43/1 46/9 46/10 49/20 50/4 50/21 50/22 53/1 55/6 55/22

third [14] 3/4 7/20 7/22 8/6 8/8 42/16

32/1 32/7 33/12 44/9 44/15 44/17 49/15

treatments [1] 47/8

tried [2] 18/20 41/5

Trial [1] 2/19

tries [1] 54/2

truly [1] 21/11

trying [1] 55/4

turns [1] 7/22

trouble [1] 6/19

true [2] 22/7 29/11

turn [5] 8/23 15/17 15/19 41/11 54/14

two [8] 6/4 9/25 10/25 12/11 16/4 42/24

vested [1] 51/13 viable [3] 34/19 35/3 35/13 view [4] 9/1 11/4 16/2 45/24 vigilant [1] 56/6 vindicate [1] 56/5 violates [1] 33/3 violating [1] 25/6 virtue [1] 53/15 vis [4] 32/11 32/11 53/14 53/14 voice [2] 48/23 55/17 voluminous [1] 56/10

voluntarily [15] 5/14 5/15 5/24 6/6 11/8

V

voluntarily... [10] 11/15 11/19 13/7 13/22 13/22 15/8 29/3 29/7 35/15 39/22 voluntariness [23] 5/19 6/8 7/5 7/7 7/8 7/10 9/24 10/11 14/11 16/2 17/20 19/24 22/10 23/14 26/21 27/19 28/19 28/21 32/13 39/19 39/20 39/25 41/23 voluntary [14] 5/19 5/21 9/22 10/1 11/13 12/6 12/8 13/21 23/1 23/16 23/18 23/21 28/25 40/2

W

wait [2] 56/6 56/8 waiting [1] 55/2 waived [1] 6/25 walk [5] 5/3 18/16 33/18 42/10 45/19 walked [1] 39/12 walks [4] 17/23 18/2 18/2 18/5 want [24] 5/7 7/17 8/4 10/20 11/3 11/5 11/25 12/2 12/18 12/19 32/7 32/9 38/1 38/4 38/7 38/14 48/20 48/24 49/5 49/16 51/6 51/12 53/22 54/14 wanted [2] 12/13 18/17

wants [1] 32/16 was [20] 10/10 11/13 13/21 19/12 21/21 26/19 33/6 35/2 35/3 37/10 38/3 44/5

46/10 48/9 55/6 55/16 55/19 55/21 55/23

56/1

Washington [1] 4/23 wasn't [2] 6/2 55/17

way [29] 8/14 9/13 9/25 22/3 22/7 22/18 22/19 22/22 22/24 23/12 24/3 26/24 29/25 30/5 30/15 30/21 35/10 43/18 43/19 43/22 44/14 44/18 44/19 44/22 44/24 46/13 46/17 49/8 51/3

ways [3] 7/3 9/25 43/8

we [92]

we'll [3] 51/7 51/18 56/13

we're [23] 9/1 10/17 12/25 17/21 19/23 22/10 22/23 23/9 26/23 34/17 40/4 46/18 within [2] 25/11 55/22 47/3 48/19 49/7 49/11 49/20 49/21 50/16 without [4] 5/20 25/6 56/3 57/6 52/17 52/17 53/23 55/10

we've [9] 13/3 13/22 17/14 18/20 26/20 37/17 42/17 46/20 54/15

welcome [2] 16/14 26/14

welfare [1] 6/14

well [19] 8/10 8/14 11/2 12/14 22/6 22/15 23/3 26/13 29/11 33/8 33/22 34/6 36/9 39/23 41/5 44/3 46/18 49/19 50/11

were [14] 21/10 21/15 23/10 34/24 35/2 39/5 44/3 44/5 44/5 45/21 48/10 50/13 54/25 55/21

what [56] 5/8 5/22 7/5 9/1 10/18 12/13 12/25 15/16 19/6 19/7 19/7 19/8 20/19 20/25 23/17 24/2 25/8 26/5 28/1 28/9 28/21 28/22 29/18 31/3 33/17 34/3 34/11 35/13 35/23 36/8 36/10 36/11 36/22 36/22 37/14 37/15 37/18 37/24 38/4 38/5 Wulff [3] 42/23 43/24 44/25 38/25 40/10 41/4 43/9 45/5 45/8 45/14 47/4 47/12 48/14 49/7 49/10 49/16 49/18 50/2 50/8

what's [7] 6/20 20/5 25/1 27/7 42/20 53/2 53/6

whatever [3] 31/9 51/14 54/4 when [12] 8/7 12/13 17/1 19/11 22/10

25/9 25/13 32/1 38/24 44/21 52/16 55/5 where [21] 5/22 9/7 10/12 14/2 18/11 18/20 19/19 22/19 27/15 28/8 40/11 42/8 yes-no [1] 12/19 43/19 43/21 44/13 45/11 45/12 48/20 48/23 49/22 53/20

whether [16] 6/12 7/21 8/8 13/2 16/19 21/5 22/15 25/18 28/22 28/23 41/15 41/22 42/24 43/5 43/5 52/22

which [38] 6/6 7/22 9/6 10/13 10/18 10/22 10/23 13/6 13/15 13/18 14/6 15/2 17/18 18/12 21/17 22/11 23/11 23/23 25/3 26/16 29/1 32/25 33/5 34/2 34/3 34/13 36/2 36/3 36/6 40/18 40/23 41/20 42/2 43/5 44/20 45/9 49/12 51/20

while [2] 33/12 45/6

who [42] 15/17 17/14 17/23 18/1 18/2 18/5 18/12 18/23 21/12 24/19 24/19 25/14 26/3 27/3 27/14 27/15 27/19 27/21 29/15 29/21 29/25 32/23 33/1 33/10 33/16 34/2 35/5 35/25 36/19 36/23 36/24 36/25 37/3 38/7 47/7 52/4 52/4 52/5 53/23 54/2 54/10 54/11

whole [3] 27/21 34/19 51/12

whom [2] 17/3 49/16

whose [4] 8/19 9/6 30/23 48/5

why [16] 8/20 9/22 13/22 13/24 15/13 16/11 20/6 35/19 36/16 37/3 37/4 37/25 38/20 42/5 46/12 54/23

wide [1] 53/18

widespread [1] 42/1

will [12] 7/5 7/14 17/10 17/11 44/22 45/9 45/16 46/18 51/19 51/20 54/2 54/9 win [7] 39/19 39/20 44/19 48/15 48/16 48/18 48/19

wish [9] 16/9 28/12 37/7 37/9 37/10 41/13 54/17 55/9 55/25

wished [1] 36/19

wishes [1] 43/1

withdraw [2] 10/24 35/15

won't [3] 5/5 27/4 45/17

wonder [1] 28/5

words [1] 31/16

work [1] 55/4

working [1] 12/15

worsening [1] 10/3

would [41] 5/24 10/15 11/10 15/21 16/10 18/25 21/16 21/18 30/25 31/2 33/15 34/22 35/1 35/16 35/20 35/21 36/8 36/10 36/18 41/22 42/3 45/4 45/19 46/2 46/3 46/24 47/10 47/10 50/2 50/4 50/6 50/11 50/13 50/15 51/3 51/6 51/12 51/12

53/11 54/19 54/25 wouldn't [10] 8/20 34/21 37/3 37/5

37/11 38/1 39/4 39/18 44/2 51/9 wrong [1] 23/5

year [6] 6/4 24/23 25/7 25/15 55/16 55/18

years [8] 6/1 6/1 16/4 18/21 53/11 54/24 55/7 55/14

yes [15] 8/10 8/10 9/21 11/22 12/19

12/21 17/8 21/2 26/8 30/3 31/6 33/24 34/1 37/20 41/14

yet [3] 27/7 27/11 46/18 you [204] you'd [2] 39/18 50/12 you're [17] 10/13 12/5 16/14 17/3 19/3 20/2 20/7 22/10 22/15 22/21 28/1 32/3

38/16 39/21 45/24 53/14 53/15 you've [10] 17/25 20/19 22/21 29/10 30/10 33/17 35/17 39/12 40/24 41/4

your [72]